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Forewords 
 
‘Exceptions are not always the proof of the old rule; they can also be the harbinger of a new 
one.’ - Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach 
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1
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mental journey. First of all my supervisor, Jörgen Hettne, LL.D, who has been a valuable 
guide in making sure I would not get lost in the jungle of European internal market law.  
A special thank you should also go to the EU experts at the unit for EU internal market at the 
National Board of Trade. During my internship with them I gained an insight into how the 
internal market law is applied in practice. They also helped me develop this thesis by 
providing valuable feedback.  I also wish to express my gratitude to Piet Finckenberg, M.D. 
and acting professor at Helsinki University and Maija Kolehmainen, M.D, for reading through 
my analysis on healthcare in order to make sure that it was correct. 
Last but not least I want to express my gratitude to my husband who patiently corrects my 
grammar so that the English is less atrocious as well as providing a mental bouncing board. 
  
                                                 
1
 Note – The theory behind the Universe and everything’s beginning, not the TV-series. 
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Abstract 
 
The goal for this thesis was to understand the scope of the healthcare exemption in the 
Directive 2006/123/EC on Services in the Internal Market (Services Directive) as it applies to 
national legislation/authorities of the membership states (MS) of EU. 
The basis for this thesis is the Services Directive; this Directive has certain exceptions in 
regards to the subject matter. Therefore, for a deeper understanding of the exception of the 
rule, first the Services Directive being the main rule is studied in a detailed manner, then  
followed by an in depth analysis of the exception.  
To understand the subject matter of this thesis I researched several different sources of EU 
aquis to establish EU’s definition of the scope for the terms “healthcare”, pharmaceutical 
services” , “healthcare professional” and  “regulated professions “. Several court cases from 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) were used to establish how these terms were interpreted 
and applied in practice.  
This led me to pick out inter alia the Services Directive, Directive 2005/36/EC on the 
recognition of professional qualifications (PQD) and Directive 2011/24 on the application of 
patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (PRD) to be the key ones for the purpose of this 
thesis to see what their effect is and how they interact and influence each other in practice.  
My conclusions are that there are four main accumulative steps that have to be in place for the 
Healthcare exemption to apply. If these steps are not fulfilled the service provided will be 
fully under the SD, unless a Venturini situation amounting to a public health concern is 
present.  It would be helpful with either further guidance from ECJ case law or guidelines 
from the Commission on the subject to confirm or deny the accuracy of the findings presented 
here. 
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Abbreviations 
THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
AG Advocate General 
Charter Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union 
EC European Communities /European Commission 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECR Reports of the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
EEA European Economic Area 
EU European Union 
IMI Internal Market Information system 
O.J Official Journal of the European Union (previously of the EC) 
ORRPI Overriding Reasons Relating to the Public Interest 
PQD Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional 
qualifications 
PRD Directive 2011/24 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-
border healthcare 
Services Directive/SD Directive 2006/123/EC on Services in the Internal Market. SD will 
only be used in conjunction with references to an article or recital to 
get a better flow of the text. 
TFEU The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TNCs  Third country nationals 
 
SWEDEN 
NBT National Board of Trade 
 
GENERAL  
Art/art/Arts/arts  Article/article/Articles/articles 
e.g.  for example 
MS/MS’s Member State/Member States 
NA/NA’s National Authority/National Authorities 
NC National Court 
NRT Nicotine replacement therapy 
p/pp page/pages 
para paragraph 
PB Public Body 
i.e.  that is 
SMEs small and medium-sized enterprises 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background to the problem 
Today, EU’s internal market is the world’s largest economy with a gross domestic product 
over 12.000 billion euro. The services sector covers approximately 70-80 percent of the 
overall production in European Union (EU).
2
  
Of the four freedoms, the cornerstones of the internal market, the key articles (art) for the 
services sector are arts 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)
3
, which prohibits restrictions to the freedom of providing services and the freedom of 
establishment. These guarantee the service providers within the EU the right to both establish 
themselves and to provide services in other Member States (MS’s). As the character of these 
articles is that of a negative integration, i.e. they function by removing barriers existing 
between the MS’s of the EU, they must be interpreted when applied in practice.  
Under these circumstances, a unified interpretation of the primary law in different MS’s is 
visionary, but proved hard to achieve in reality. In practice, the regulatory environment in the 
different MS’s varies immensely.4 Thus, in the pursuit of a more integrated internal Market 
within the services sector, additional legal tools in form of positive integration was required to 
amend discrepancies of the application of the arts 49 and 56 TFEU. To meet this need, the 
Directive 2006/123/EC on Services in the Internal Market (Services Directive),
5
 codifying 
legislative and practical measures, was adopted in December 2006. The aim of the Services 
Directive was to remove legal and administrative barriers to trade within the single market by 
simplified and more transparent procedures for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
and consumers when they either provide (on temporary or more permanent basis) or use 
services within EU. The Services Directive is fully transposed today in all the Member States 
(MS’s) as the deadline for this was three (3) years from adoption of the directive. However, 
the development of a policy on quality of service does not end there.
6
  
The Services Directive requires MS’s to abstain from measures that can impede the good 
functioning of the internal market and to vigilantly review their legal acts. The dual purpose 
of this is to ensure that no conflict with the Services Directive remains and that no new 
barriers of trade are being created unless they can be objectively justified by express 
derogations in art 52.2 
7
 or overriding reasons relating to the public interest (ORRPI) 
originating from the ECJ case-law.
8
  A special attention should also be paid to art 16.3, which 
                                                 
2
 Bank, 2012 http://data.worldbank.org/country/EUU. 
3
 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008. 
4
 See Commission, Report from the Commisssion to the Council and the European Parliament on the state of the 
internal market for services, 2002 p 70. 
5
 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in the 
Internal Market, OJ L376 of 27.12.2006 pp 36-68. 
6
 See, e.g. Commission, Single Market scoreboard, 2013. 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/priority_areas/index_en.htm 
7
 See recital 41SD for a definition of public policy in context of the Services Directive. 
8
 See, e.g. C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1996] 
ECR I-4165, para 37. See also for a non-exhaustive list the preamble recital 40 and art 4(8) SD. 
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expressly limits the possibility of a MS to impose requirements to four exemption grounds in 
the case of provision of cross-border services.
9
 
This is markedly crystallized in the notification obligation to the Commission in arts 39.5 and 
15.7 SD. The MS must continuously notify changes in requirements concerning cross-border 
provision of services and establishment. In practice this means that the designated National 
Authorities (NA’s) must assess, on case by case basis, if ‘requirements which affect access to 
or the exercise of a service activity’10 issued by other  NA’s, whether existing or new, are 
non-discriminatory, justified by reasons mentioned above and proportionate as well as if they 
are within the scope of the notification obligation.
11
  As the concept of requirement is 
extremely widely drawn, it catches an extensive range of requirements including the ones 
with a neutral effect on free movement of services and establishment. 
The Services Directive covers a broad range of service activities; hence, to enable an efficient 
and correct evaluation, a clear understanding of the scope of the Directive and its exemptions 
is of vital importance for the NA’s designated to perform this task.  
The same is true in context of the notification obligation; to ensure that no relevant restrictive 
measures created by the MS’s escape assessment, due to lack of proper demarcation, 
notification must take place. I.e., to be able to know what to notify, there must exist an 
accurate definition of what needs not to be notified. This may be tricky at times as the scope 
of the application of a particular exemption is not always known due to lack of relevant 
Jurisprudence from the Court and insufficient guidance from the Commission.  
A good example of one of these exemptions is the provision of healthcare in art 2.2(f) SD, 
expressly mentioned by the Services Directive.
12
 It is unclear whether the interpretation of the 
exclusion is constructed narrowly or broadly.  I.e. is the entire healthcare sector and/or sectors 
related to it excluded?  Can some division be drawn between the actual provision of 
healthcare and a service that is not actually healthcare but related to it by either the nature of 
the service or the profession providing the service?  
Thus, every time specific demands somewhat related to healthcare are being introduced by a 
MS, the NA chosen to make the relevant assessment must raise the question if the 
requirements are covered by the healthcare exception. To perform this assessment can be 
quite a challenge. Individual legal analysts may have varying opinions regarding the relevant 
scope leading to an inability to have a clear standpoint within the NA. 
The ECJ case law has systematically considered non-justified measures constituting a 
restriction of relevant areas on the freedom of establishment and services as incompatible with 
arts 49 or 56 TFEU.
13
 In July 2013 the Court finally discussed the exemption of art 2.2(f) SD 
                                                 
9
  NBT, Justifications under the Services Directive, 2013 p 3. 
10
 See the 9
th
 recital SD. 
11
 See arts 15.3 SD and 15.7 SD regarding establishment and arts 16.1 SD, 16.3 SD and 39.5 SD in context of 
services. 
12
 Art 2(2) SD. 
13
 See, e.g. C-372/04 Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR 
I-4325, paras 86-87. 
 8 
 
in detail in its judgment in Fermabel.
14
 Just three months later came another ruling, Ottica,
15
 
which shed further light on the matter. According to these rulings the concept of “healthcare 
services” is to be interpreted broadly in EU legislation.16 These judgments contribute to an 
improved legal certainty in form of a clearer definition of the scope of the healthcare 
exemption by tackling the dilemma of how the hybrid operations, where a service provider 
provides both commercial and health services, should be assessed. Some uncertainty still 
remains though, particularly in the grey area of healthcare providers and the paramedical and 
how they should be assessed. Thus, the NA’s are still riding a tiger about some national 
requirements, as to whether they should be notified under the Services Directive or not. 
1.2 Purpose and research question 
The purpose of this study is to discuss and resolve the issues caused by this lack of legal 
certainty. In search of a possible solution which could work in the absence of a precise 
provision different Sources of Law are utilized to identify, scrutinize and finally resolve the 
practical problems at stake.   
The thesis aims to build a bridge between an academic analysis and the implementation in 
practice by the NA’s of the matter by searching for a precise definition of the scope of the 
health exemption so that any suspect measures may be possible to assess in accordance with 
the notification requirement. Hopefully this will contribute to a solution of the problem that 
causes less legal uncertainty.  
The author argues that a strict reading of art 2.2 (f) SD together with recital 22 SD does not 
necessary lead to a correct interpretation of the healthcare exemption. As a consequence 
unnecessary legal uncertainty possibly resulting in misunderstanding of the rule remains. This 
needs to be dealt with in more detail on an EU level in order to foster a correct and 
harmonized interpretation by all the MS’s. Ideas originating from this research for improved 
clarity, de lege ferenda, will be brought up for consideration where relevant. 
The research question; what is the precise scope of article 2.2(f) SD as can be defined within 
the current status of Union law? will be used as a tool to achieve these objectives.  
1.3 Delimitations 
The focus of this thesis is the Services Directive. 
Hence, even though arts 56 and 49 TFEU are explained and discussed, being the primary 
source for the free movement rights that the Services Directive codifies from the case law off 
the Court, the actual content of the Services Directive. To support the interpretation of 
arguments made, the relationship between other directives and particular parts of them, 
relevant to the interpretation of the healthcare exemption, will also be discussed and analyzed 
in depth. As the theme of this thesis is the exemption of healthcare, which according to art 
2(2) (f) SD is not dependent of the way they are organized or financed, these latter aspects 
                                                 
14
 C-57/12, FemarbelASBL v Commission, paras 35-41. 
15
  C-539/11, Ottica New Line di Accardi Vincenzo v Comune di Campobello di Mazara, para 18 et seq. 
16
 See C-57/12, Femarbel ASBL v Commission, para 35 and C-539/11, Ottica New Line di Accardi Vincenzo v 
Comune di Campobello di Mazara, 2013 para 15 et seq. 
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will not be discussed. Reimbursements and prior authorization schemes are dealt with in other 
secondary legislation and also fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
This thesis emphasis is particularly on the rules regarding services, i.e. art 2.2(f) SD. Thus, 
remedies and countervailing measures will not be debated much, albeit they are mentioned, 
since they have no actual value for the answer to the main question of this thesis. The same is 
true for competition law aspects. Moreover, due to the fact that free movement of services and 
establishment are applicable to nationals of the EU only, no third country nationals (TNCs) 
will be discussed. 
 
Finally, to stay within the focus of this study, only provision of services in context of free 
movement of services and establishment are discussed. This means inter alia that the other 
freedoms, goods capital and persons except where they are intrinsically connected to the 
provision of services/establishment, will not be brought up. Also the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union
17
 (Charter) is not discussed. 
 
1.4 Method and material 
The primary law being the supreme source of law in the EU, it is at the zenith of the European 
legal order. As such, the primary law takes precedence of all other sources of law. Thus, the 
secondary law must be perceived in the context of EU primary law.  Intrinsically, the Services 
Directive must be interpreted and implemented in this context, particularly vis-à-vis the 
internal market freedoms.
18
 If any clashes occur the Treaties as Lex superior have the 
prerogative in regards to EU law and national law both.
19
 This is of particular relevance, due 
to the occasionally questionable quality of the legal text of the Services Directive; 
contradictions do occur within the Services Directive itself. A good example of a mismatch is 
the healthcare exemption that is the subject of this study: The art 2.2(f) SD of healthcare 
exemption does not mention pharmaceutical services, particularly cited in recital 22SD as part 
of healthcare. 
The thesis utilizes the European legal method
20
 and doctrine with a specific focus on the 
internal market acquis. I.e. the assessment of the current law is based on the acquis 
communautaire; primary Law,
21
 secondary law and jurisprudence from the EU Courts.  Even 
some preparatory legal acts are investigated where/if they are important to the subject. 
Additionally, reports and notification decisions completed by the National Board of Trade 
                                                 
17
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ 2000/C 364/01). 
18
 Especially in light of the art 3 TEU, arts 9 TFEU (the horizontal social clause), art 14 TFEU, Protocol No 26 
annexed to the Treaties and the Charter. See Report form Opinion of the Committee on employment and social 
affairs on the Internal Market for Services: State of Play and Next Steps (2012/2144(INI)) p 2. 
19
 See Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, Case 11-70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125 and Case 106/77 Amministrazione 
delle finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. 
20
 Hettne, J. (2011). EU-rättslig metod. Stockholm: Norstedts juridik. 
21
 The Treaties Commission, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
2010 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union (The Charter). 
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(NBT) as well as interviews and discussions with the personnel of NBT will be utilized. All 
the relevant data has been updated on the 16
th
 of May 16, 2014. 
The thesis has benefitted from an internship at the NBT which enabled and ensured a solid 
insight of the application of EU law in the day to day work by a NA designated to do this, as 
well as access to empiri on the notifications made within the services related to healthcare 
sectors by different MS’s.   
The empiri presented by this thesis encompasses inter alia actual notifications made by 
different MS’s during the time period 2011-2013.  Most specifically the Swedish 
notifications, including the decisions of the NBT (the Swedish designated NA), on whether 
the PA measures should be notified or not. The Swedish implementation of the Services 
Directive will furthermore be used as an example where relevant. 
By pinpointing relevant benchmarks in context of the area of healthcare within the EU 
legislation this thesis thrives to connect these as references to draw a comprehensible image 
of the scope of the art 2.2 (f) SD exemption. As a starting point the following assumption is 
made; since the services that fill the cumulative criteria of recital 22 of the Preamble and art 
2.2(f) SD are outside of the scope of the Services Directive consequently, e contrario, if one 
of the criteria is not met the service is within the scope of the Services Directive.  
The thesis starts by studying the Services Directive in detail since the author believes that the 
key for understanding an exception of a rule is to first understand the rule the exemption 
springs from. Only then can the, why, what and how of what is being excepted be explained 
appropriately. The relationship between the SD and other relevant secondary legislation is 
studied. ECJ case law will be researched for guidance on how the exemption should be 
interpreted and applied. The interpretation methods used are those governing the rulings of 
the ECJ, inter alia by text (literal Interpretation), context (contextual Interpretation) and 
purpose (teleological Interpretation).
22
Also other integration methods will be applied if 
relevant. 
The analysis will be initiated by a literal reading of art 2.2(f) SD together with recital 22 of 
the Services Directive, followed by an interpretation of the concept of ‘healthcare services’ 
based on its purpose and general structure. These are then put into the context of the scheme 
laid down by the SD in accordance with the formula presented by the Court in Fermabel.
23
  
1.5 Disposition 
The thesis has six main chapters, each of them containing subchapters. To present the material 
as pedagogically as possible the material is demonstrated in a logical order. 
Chapter one provides an introduction of the background, the purpose and the key research 
question and sets the framework and scope of this thesis. Also the method and material used 
are explained. 
                                                 
22
 See Maduro, M. P. (2007, December 5). Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of 
Constitutional Pluralism. The European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.1, Issue 2 art 8 p 4. 
23
 See C-57/12 Femarbel ASBL v Commission, para 34. 
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Chapter two describes and explains the purpose and the function of the arts 49and 56 TFEU 
as well as provides an overview of the Services Directive. In addition, the hierarchy of 
sources in EU Law and the context of the interpretation and implementation of the Directive 
are clarified. 
Chapter three aims to sort out the scope of the Services Directive in detail. The purpose of the 
Directive is illuminated as well as the inherited risks. The Services Directives distinct 
characteristics are shed light upon. The notification obligation will be explained to provide an 
insight into what part a proper assessment of the “restriction” plays in the whole monitoring 
process of the EU law application by different MS’s. 
Chapter four studies the exemption of the healthcare in context of the SD to establish a 
conceptual definition of the term. It aims to define and isolate the scope of the healthcare 
exemption by utilizing relevant jurisprudence from the European Courts for an increased 
understanding. The relationship to the Patients’ rights Directive is scrutinized with the 
objective of establishing a proper demarcation for the healthcare exemption. 
Chapter five seeks to identify the meaning of regulated professions. The link between the 
Services Directive and the Directive for Professional Qualifications is examined. The purpose 
of this is to identify the criteria necessary for the healthcare exemption. 
Chapter six assembles, assimilates and analyses all elements, with argumentation about some 
of the inherent problems of the Services Directive in general and particularly regarding proper 
identification of the exclusion of healthcare followed by a conclusion which wraps up this 
thesis. 
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2. Free Movement of Services and the Services Directive  
 
2.1 Free Movement of Services 
Today EU is a service based economy. Services are found on all levels of economic, social 
and industrial infrastructure, covering more than 70% of economic activity and employment 
in the EU.
24
 That is why services, and particularly ensuring their free movement, are crucial to 
the internal market of the EU. 
The provision regarding the free movement of services is established by art 56 TFEU. Art 57 
TFEU designates services as an economic activity, typically provided for remuneration, 
constituting “consideration” for the service in question.25  In essence, the MS’s are prohibited 
from restricting; access to services for service recipients and for service providers to provision 
the services in cross-border situations within the internal market. 
All type of movement of services provided on a temporary basis that have a cross-border 
element are included. Where either the service provider
26
, or the service receiver
27
, travels 
from one MS into another MS to provide/receive the service.
 28
 Art 56 even covers situations 
where the service itself moves
29
 e.g. via internet services. Internal Market aquis is only 
appropriate where there is a cross-border element present. Art 56 TFEU covers performance 
of an activity or professions on temporary basis; else the relevant activities fall within the 
scope of art 49, free movement of establishment.  
If a MS wishes to restrict the free movement it must justify the restriction by express 
derogations in art 52.2
30
 or ORRPI set by the ECJ case-law. Restrictions are also subject to a 
proportionality test, i.e. they must be appropriate and not too far-reaching to achieve the 
objective they are intended for. 
Art 56 TFEU applies to persons and covers both physical and legal persons, which are 
nationals of a MS of the EU. Hence, third Country nationals cannot invoke art 56 TFEU for 
their benefit. 
31
 For judicial persons to be considered as nationals of a MS, the country of 
registration sets their nationality. It is also of importance to know that in a purely internal MS 
situation the Union law will not apply,
32
 even though this concept has been subject to some 
                                                 
24
 See Commission, A Single Market for Services http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/services/. 
25
 See, e.g. case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, p 17. 
26
 See, e.g. case 33/74 van Binsbergen v Bestuur [1974] ECR 1299 and C-341/05 Laval Un Partneri Ltd v 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] I-11767, 2007. 
27
 See e.g. joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Graziana Luisi and Giuseppe Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro[1984] 
ECR 377 and C-372/04 Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health [2006] 
ECR I-4325.  
28
 See C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1996] ECR I-
4165. 
29
 See C-384/93 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiën [1995] ECR I-1141. 
30
 See the recital 41SD for a definition of public policy in context of the Services Directive. 
31
 See e.g. case 136/78 Auer [1979] ECR 437, para 28. 
32
 See case 175/78 The Queen v Vera Ann Saunders [1979] ECR 1129, following a lead from case 115/78,  
 J. Knoors v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken [1979] ECR 399. 
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erosion over the recent years.
33
 The service must also be legal in the MS according to the laws 
in the MS where the service is being provided. 
The area of services is characterized by a strong diversity. As demonstrated by ECJ practice, 
services do not only encompass temporary provision of services, but also acts as a general 
‘gather-all’ for items34 that cannot be covered by any of the other three free movement 
provisions. ECJ case law on the subject varies from matters regarding social objectives, inter 
alia delivery of welfare, to clearly technical issues like taxation and protection of intellectual 
property rights. There is also a decent level of harmonization within the area in form of 
directives. 
Art 56 TFEU is vertically applicable, as it creates rights and access to legal remedies for a 
person vis-à-vis state actions, in casu service providers and receivers.
35
 However, even after 
the Courts ruling in Laval
36
 uncertainty remains in relation to whether the arts 56 and 49 
TFEU have a horizontal direct effect. Consequently, at the current state of EU law it is not 
possible to draw a conclusion that a horizontal applicability in regards to the provisioning of 
services exist.  
The Court applies a market access approach in relation to services i.e. the Keck doctrine is not 
really applicable in this context. Further there is no clear de minimis rule in the field of free 
movement of services. The Court in case Säger v Dennemeyer 
37
 set that quite firmly. 
However, later case law has in practice to some degree applied a type of de minimis to narrow 
down art 56 TFEU were it has been seen by the ECJ as necessary.
38
 
2.2 Free Establishment 
Art 49 TFEU comes to play when Union citizens establish economic activities on a permanent 
basis in another MS than their own.
39
 Self-employed and companies (art 54 TFEU) exercising 
economic activities are covered by this provision, vesting them with the ability to freely set up 
primary or secondary establishments under the same circumstances as nationals of the MS 
they are establishing in.
40
 In line with other free movement provisions, all discriminatory 
restrictions on the free movement of establishment are prohibited, unless objectively justified 
                                                 
33
 See Sousa, P. C. (2011). Catch Me If You Can? The Market Freedoms’ Ever- expanding Outer Limits. 
European Journal of Legal Studies, 162-191 p 1, Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion in Case C-34/09 
Zambrano of 30 September 2010 in situations of reverse discrimination and joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 
Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez [2010] ECR I-4629, paras 39-40. See also Case C-448/98 Criminal proceedings 
against Jean-Pierre Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663  and C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, para 52 
and Joined Cases C-159/12 to C-161/12 Alessandra Venturini v ASL Varese and others. 
34
 See C-452/04 Fidium Finanz AG v Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [2006) ECR I-9521, para 
32. 
35
 See, e.g. case 33/74 van Binsbergen v Bestuur [1974] ECR 1299. 
36
 See, e.g. C-341/05 Laval Un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] I-11767. 
37
 See, e.g. C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd. [1991] ECR I-4221, para 12. 
38
 Waele, J. M. (2006). A Retreat from Säger? Servicing or Fine-Tuning the Application of Article 49 EC, Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 33(3), 207–228 p 226 and Joined Cases C-544 and 545/03 Mobistar SA v 
Commune de Fléron [2005] ECR I-7723, 2005, para 31. For establishment see C-418/93 Semeraro di casa v 
Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco[1996] ECR I-2975, para 32 and C-379/92 Peralta ECR [1994] I-3453. 
39
 See, e.g. C-221/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport.v. Factortame  (Factortame II) [1991] ECR-
3905, para 20. 
40
 See case 107/83Ordre des avocats au Barreau de Paris v Onno Klopp [1984] ECR 2971. 
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by art 52 TFEU - express derogations or ORRPI. Even restrictions that can be considered 
non-discriminatory may be caught by art 49 TFEU.  
Arts 49 and 54 TFEU can be used as defense against restrictions set up by either the home MS 
or the new host MS of the individual, self-employed or company.
41
 
The Court’s interpretation sets the scope of art 49 TFU wide.42 Thus the concept of 
establishment catches a wide range of activities from religious groups to sportsmen.
43
 Even a 
traineeship required to enter into a profession is covered.
44
 Identical to the list of services in 
art 57 TFEU, the list of examples in art 49 TFEU is non-exhaustive.  
As regards the self-employed, the MS that the EU nationals seek to establish themselves in 
should respect the mutual recognition principle. 
45
 The situation for companies is a bit more 
complex; as the national laws governing the treatment of a company as a national vary 
between “real seat” and “incorporation” theories.46  
Nevertheless, primary and secondary establishments both may move within the EU. The 
distinction between economic activities preformed on stable or on temporary basis is not 
crystal clear as existence of some permanent infrastructure does not mean that establishment 
has taken place.
47
  
The vertical direct effect of free movement of establishment was affirmed by the ECJ in 
Reyners.
48
 After the Courts ruling in Viking the horizontal effect of art 49 TFEU is slightly 
unclear. Private undertakings may evoke art 49TFEU in their defense against Trade Unions. 
However, it has not yet been proven by the Court that this horizontal effect may be extended 
to even apply between private undertakings. 
2.3 The Services Directive 
Owing to the role as a driving force that the services have to the economy of the EU, the 
Services Directive was finally adopted in December 2006. Due to the herculean task of 
implementation into the national laws of the MS’s it was allowed a lengthy transposition 
period which ended in December 2009. The current Directive is the final draft of three, which 
was finally adopted after serious teething troubles. Hitherto the two earlier versions, the 
Bolkestein draft of 2004
49
 and the follow-up known as the McCreevy draft, both failed due to 
                                                 
41
 See case 115/78 J. Knoors v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken [1979] ECR 399. 
42
 See e.g. C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1996] 
ECR I-4165, para 20. 
43
 See e.g. C-415/93 ASBL&l UEFA v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR-4921 and C-196/87 Udo Steymann v 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1988]ECR I-6159. 
44
 See C-313/01 Christine Morgenbesser v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli avvocati di Genova [2003] ECR I-13467.  
45
 See C-340/89 Irène Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten Baden-
Württemberg [1991] ECR I-2357. 
46
 See e.g. C-81/87 The Queen v H. M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and 
General Trust plc [1988] ECR 5483, 1988 and C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008] ECRI-09641. 
47
 C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1996] ECR I-
4165. 
48
 See case 2-74 Jean Reyners v Belgian State [1974] ECR 631. 
49
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market 
[SEC(2004) 21]. (The Bolkenstein draft, 2004) 
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too high ambition levels in context of mutual recognition and the insignificant margin for 
MS’s to restrict provision of services. 
The original draft, the Bolkestein Draft, already provided a legal framework for three main 
concepts by: 
 Eliminating obstacles to free movement in regards to establishment for providers of 
services 
 Eliminating obstacles to free movement in regards to providers of temporary services in 
accordance with the Country of Origin Principle (CoOP).  
 Setting in-depth rules for both the establishment of' ‘points of single contact’ and on 
mutual assistance between MS’s. 
It also, corresponding to the current Directive, gave rights and provided assistance to the 
service recipients of other MS’s.50 Yet, the dual key issues that drove a final nail in the coffin 
of the Bolkestein Draft were the CoOP which meant that the service providers would be 
subject solely to the laws of the MS of their establishment and the issue of posted workers
51
,  
The McCreevy Draft, a pale follower of the original, to a large extent imitated the structure of 
the Bolkestein Draft but was narrower in scope. CoOP, healthcare 2.2(f) SD
52
 and social 
services 2.2(j) SD had been removed. Moreover, the list of forbidden requirements was 
chopped short.   
The final draft of the SD, that became the currently applied Directive, bears several 
similarities to the second draft. The major differences being further exclusion of activities 
from the scope of the Services Directive and the ‘points of single contact’ obligations 
reduced.  
Just like TFEU the Services Directive contains essential rules on both temporary provision of 
services and establishment. I.e. the way the Services Directive regulates trade in services 
varies, it is contingent on how the service is provided between MS’s; on temporary basis 
(service) or by selling through the service firm which is established in the MS where the 
services are to be sold (establishment). The range of services the Services Directive covers is 
broad. It is applicable to individuals and companies alike, covering many services sectors with 
some particular sectors being excluded.
53
  
 
National red tape linked to these excluded services must meet the terms of other rules of EU 
law, especially arts 49 and 56 TFEU, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services which the Services Directive replicates. The services excluded are the following:  
 
 SGIs (Services of General Interest) 
 Electronic communications services that are covered by other community legislation 
                                                 
50
 Commission, COM(2004) 2 final/3, 2004, art 21. 
51
 Barnard, C. (2008), Unravelling the Services Directive,Common Market Law Review 45, pp 328-329. 
52
 See Bolkenstein draft e.g. recital 8 and art 23 for assumption of healthcare costs. 
53
 According to NBT 40.6% of the Services sectors are covered by the Services Directive. 
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 Audiovisual services 
 Financial services 
 Transport services within the scope of Title V TFEU. 
 Healthcare services on condition that they are provided by healthcare professionals, 
recognized as such by the MS concerned, to patients to assess, maintain or restore 
their state of health. 
 Staffing company services 
 Services provided by private security companies 
 Gambling services 
 SSGIs (Social Services of General Interest), i.e. some social services that are based on 
solidarity. Those may be delivered by the State, by trustees of the State or by charities 
acknowledged as such by the State.  
 Notaries and bailiffs services 
If a MS wishes to hamper cross-border situation service transactions they must be able to 
justify that constraint objectively and stay within what is suitable and proportional to gain the 
effect wished for. 
The Services Directive has vertical direct effect
54
 as it provides legal remedies for individual 
rights under specific circumstances but is not limited to that. Even though the Services 
Directive is mostly about vertical relationships, there are also horizontal provisions which 
affect the actions of the service providers.
55
  Service providers have therefore same horizontal 
obligations in regards to service recipients on the market.
56
  
When studying the Services Directive, five main areas of regulative provisions can be 
identified; 
 the provisions on administrative simplification,  
 freedom of establishment and  
 the free movement of services activities,  
 the rights of recipients,  
 quality of services and administrative cooperation between MS’s of the EU.57  
Structurally, the Directive itself is divided into eight chapters.  
The first chapter contains general provisions; it establishes the purpose, area of application, 
the relationship with other EU legislation and offers relevant definitions.  
The second chapter is about administrative simplification and points of single contact.  
                                                 
54
 See, e.g. C-41-74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337 and C-152/84 Marshall v Southampton 
& South West Health Authority [1986] ECR 723. 
55
 Intrepreting article 20(2) of the Services Directive. Stockholm, Sweden: National Board of Trade.p 1. 
56
 Art 22 SD. 
57
 Affairs, M. f. (2008), Genomförande av tjänstedirektivet Ds2008:75. Stockholm: Goverment Offices of 
Sweden.p 28.  
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The third chapter deals with the freedom of establishment, i.e., for a service provider to 
establish economic activities on a permanent basis in a MS other than the MS it is a national 
of.  
The fourth chapter deals with the different facets of services; the rights the service providers 
and receivers have when offering/receiving cross-border services.  
In chapter five, provisions on the quality of services can be found, whereas chapter six 
concentrates on the administrative procedures and cooperation with special attention to the 
Internal Market Information system (IMI).  
The seventh chapter explains the convergence agenda of the Services Directive into NL.  
Chapter eight closes the Directive by final provisions. 
2.4 The purpose of the Services Directive and inherited risks 
In the words of the Commission Handbook: 
’ The objective of the Services Directive is to make progress towards a genuine Internal Market 
in Services so that, in the largest sector of the European economy, both businesses and 
consumers can take full advantage of the opportunities it presents. By supporting the 
development of a truly integrated Internal Market in Services, the Directive will help realise the 
considerable potential in terms of economic growth and job creation of the services sector in 
Europe.’ … 
Accordingly, the Services Directive is an important component of the renewed Lisbon 
Strategy, Europa 2020
58
, for growth and employment. A genuine, truly integrated, internal 
market for services is the ultimate goal that the Directive strives for.  
Beneath the stated surface motives the motivations for the SD are layered.  On one hand, the 
SD aims for simplification of administration and enhanced cooperation, by improving the 
regulatory environment for service providers operating cross-border services on temporary 
basis.
59
 To achieve this; the Services Directive specifies the “freedom to provide services” 
clause. Under the terms of this clause MS’s should, supposedly, not enact any national 
requirements on the service providers from other MS’s of the EU. As a result, the MS’s are 
not allowed to impose requirements upon those providers unless they meet certain conditions, 
i.e. express derogations or OPRRI.   
Different codified obstacles for establishment by MS’s are categorized in a grey list, art 15 
SD and a black list, art 14 SD. Black list requirements are simply prohibited, while grey list 
type of obstacles call for exceptional caution from MS’s if any of those are implemented. 
Services are dealt with separately in art 16 SD, the most far reaching provision of the whole 
Directive, prohibiting all type of restrictions as well as restricting the usage of justifications.  
                                                 
58
 See http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm. 
59
 These topics are reflections of smart regulation and 'Think Small' principle. See Commission, Smart 
Regulation , 2013 and Commission, Communication from the Commission“Think Small First”A .COM(2008) 
394 final“Small Business Act” for Europe, 2008 p 3. 
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Ultimately, the obstacles for recipients wishing to enjoy cross-border services and all 
discriminatory requirements on grounds of nationality should be removed.
60
 This duty of non-
discrimination the MS’s public administrations (i.e. the State, regional or local authorities) 
must abide by. The same applies to the general conditions of a MS’s service providers for 
access to a service from another MS. The MS’s are appointed guardians to ensure that the 
service providers will not discriminate recipients.
61
 
On the other hand the Services Directive sends a message, not only to the providers or 
receivers of services, but to the legislators of the MS’s. Art 9 SD is targeting the underlying 
issue of passive resistance of assimilating relevant EU jurisprudence in several MS’s. This is 
unusual; other directives have not usually the same aim.
 62
  In practice, the Commission drives 
the MS’s on a quest to catalog and verify their national rules and their compatibility with EU 
law, thus enforcing the MS to adapt its legislation to the jurisprudence of the Court properly.  
Since the Services Directive was originally intended for small companies, smart regulation
63
 
and the 'Think Small' principle
64
 should be central topics for the Directive. Four points in 
particular should be in place before national rules are adopted at the EU level: 
65
They must be 
clear, easily understood and unambiguous; void of any 'gold plating’66; mandatory procedures 
for companies and people ought to be doable swiftly and via electronic means; guaranteed to 
provide information and help as well as fast and effective redress if need be. 
To augment the rights of service recipients, and reinforce their trust in the internal market, the 
Services Directive obliges MSs to implement the above mentioned ‘points of single contact’, 
which function as one-stop-shops for service providers.  All relevant information, as well as 
completion of all procedures and formalities at a distance and by electronic means, is offered 
by the ‘point of single contact’ of each MS. These ‘points of single contact’ will also offer 
advice on the legal requirements, especially on consumer protection rules. 
The inherited risks about the Services Directive are numerous. For instance since the Services 
Directive merely provides the MSs with a framework aimed to harmonize their rules and 
standards, while leaving significant leeway as to the way of achieving those targets at the 
national level, considerable differences between the laws of the MSs across Europe may still 
occur.  
                                                 
60
 See Commission Handbook on implementation of the services directive, 2007 p 7. 
61
 Intrepreting ,icle 20 (2) of the Services Directive. Stockholm, Sweden: National Board of Trade. 
62
 Waele, H. d. (2009). The Transposition and Enforcement of the Services Directive:A Challenge for the 
European and the National Legal Orders, European Public Law 15 no.4, 523-531 p 526, referring to the 
respective national report by Kok, Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and employment. E.g. 
Germany, the Netherlands and UK had not implemented the relevant provisions into the National laws. 
63
 I.e. The rules ought to be tailored to effectively function for those they are targeted at. See the Commission 
communication "Smart Regulation in the European Union", COM (2010) 543 final and the Inter-Institutional 
Agreement on better law-making (2003/C 321/01). 
64
 I.e. keeping the level of administrative burdens to the smallest possible. See, e.g. Commission Report 
"Minimizing regulatory burden for SMEs - Adapting EU regulation to the needs of microenterprises" COM 
(2011) 803 final. 
65
 See COM(2012)259 - Better governance for the single market. 
66
 For a definition of ’gold plating’ see ‘Clarifying Gold Platting- Better Implementation of EU Legislation, 
Swedish Better Regulation Council 2012. 
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The devil being in the details; in the case of the Services Directive the issue is both in the 
details available and in the lack of them. The quality of the Services Directive is questionable; 
contradictions can be found in the Directive’s wording as well as several ambiguities, this 
causes issues for the NAs.
67
  
This is especially true in context of art 16 SD, where the wording implies that ‘requirements’ 
catches even those that are non-discriminatory, irrespective of their form, purpose or effect on 
trade. I.e. art 16 SD seems to restrict the possibility to objectively justify any ‘requirements’ 
to the four specifically mentioned by the art. The narrowness of justifications expressed in art 
16 SD has caused some confusion as the ground for justifications of restrictions mentioned by 
paras (1) and (3) are limited from what has been recognized by the case law of the Court as 
ORRPI.
68
  
Several MS’s have indeed interpreted the specific mentioning of the four grounds for 
justification; public policy, public security, public health or the protection of the environment, 
as an exhaustive list.
69
 Support for this interpretation has been lent by the official opinion of 
the Commission
70
 which, even though lacking a legally normative value, is generally used as 
a guiding tool by NA’s and scholars alike. Since ECJ jurisprudence is mostly absent in this 
matter, legal uncertainty remains. The only case shedding any light on the matter, 
Commission v Portugal
 71
 is predating the closing date of the implementation of the SD.   
In the ECJ´s view the general obligations set out in art 16(1) stem directly from art 56 
TFEU.
72
 Hence, by reason of deduction, also justifications deriving from those same rules 
should be included.
73
 
This is highly unsatisfactory for the providers and recipients of services, as well as for the 
NA’s, who irrespectively of the legal status quo must address the issues raised concerning 
admissible justifications.  
The NBT has made the call that ORPPI, beyond what is expressively mentioned in art 16 SD, 
will be accepted as justifications in Sweden until the appearance of relevant case-law from the 
Court.
74
 This conclusion was reached through extensive research into the matter, using in 
particular the following; 
                                                 
67
 Ulrich Stelkens, The Implementation of the EU Services Directive: Transposition, Problems and Strategies 
(T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, The Hague) p 14. 
68
 C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1996] ECR I-
4165. 
69
 Ulrich Stelkens, The Implementation of the EU Services Directive: Transposition, Problems and Strategies 
(T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, The Hague) p 14 referring to reports from e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany 
and Lithuania. 
70
  See Commission, Handbook on implementation of the services directive, 2007 p 36 and Commission, The Eu 
single Market, Services Directive Quick guide, 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/services-
dir/guide/index_en.htm. 
71
 See C-458/08 Commission v Portugal ECR [2010] I-11599, 2010 . 
72
 See C-458/08 Commission v Portugal ECR [2010] I-11599, 2010 paras 88-89. 
73
 See Hatzopoulos, V. (2013). The Court's approach to Services (20062012):From case law to case load. 
Common Market Law Review 50, 459-502, p 462. 
74
 See NBT, Justifications under the Services Directive, 2013 p 19. 
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 the wordings of recital 78SD and art 16SD75  
 the hierarchy of laws as confirmed by art 3.3SD,76  
 the origin of the Directive,77  
 considering both exclusive and subsidiary applications78 as well as the opinions of the 
Advocate Generals.
79
 
There are still several areas where legal uncertainty remains, e.g. the scope of the healthcare 
exemption, if the SGEIs are within the scope of the SD and if so to which extent and the 
scope of the exclusion of labor law in art 1(6) SD. It is however clear that for services outside 
the scope of the Services Directive, either the primary EU law or other appropriate legislation 
for those types of services will apply.
80
 
As for further issues, the Services Directive might be applicable for purely internal situations 
based on its wording. Only chapter IV of SD explicitly links to cross-border services. Other 
chapters have no such references; hence there is room for interpretation if the other arts 
should be treated otherwise. In the doctrine, the opinion has been expressed that the SD is 
valid for cross-border situations only.
81
 
Both the placement of the legal basis for the Services Directive, arts 53 and 62 TFEU, and the 
legal practice of the ECJ support transnational application.
82
 Rights of establishment are 
initiated in art 49, which especially concerns the situation of cross-border movement and has 
precedence over art 53, both being part of chapter 2 of the TFEU. So even though the context 
of the Directive provides no clear guidance for its sphere of application this does not mean 
that a conclusion can be drawn solely by the absence of such a provision. 
In summary, the concept of the Services Directive and its lack of objectives observed together 
with art 53TFEU leads to the hypothesis that the SD is applicable for cross-border situations 
only. In practice, the difference is however marginal since the NA’s screen all requirements 
imposed on service providers, no matter who they are targeted at, i.e. nationals of that MS or 
nationals of other MS’s , to ensure that no hinder to free movement is taking place. I.e. even if 
the SD would not de jure be intended for purely internal situations, due to the way it is 
applied by NA’s, its effect is de facto that it may be applicable without a cross border element 
having taken place.  
2.5 Summary 
The Services Directive is a horizontal legal instrument that gathers all service sectors not 
especially excluded from its scope in a collective regulatory system. Temporary provision of 
                                                 
75
 See NBT, Justifications under the Services Directive, 2013, p 3 et seq. 
76
 Ibidem, p 9 et seq. 
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 Ibidem, p 7 et seq. 
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 Ibidem, p 12. 
79
 Ibidem, p 13 et seq. 
80
 The Posted Workers Directive 96/71/EC on the posting of employees in connection with the provision of 
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81
 Ulrich Stelkens, The Implementation of the EU Services Directive: Transposition, Problems and Strategies 
(T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, The Hague) p 68. 
82
 See Joined cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Uecker and Jacquet, [1997] ECR I-3171 para16. 
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services and establishment are covered by the Directive which introduces rules on 
administrative simplification and cooperation of NA’s, both between and within MS’s. Its 
most distinguishing feature is the obligation for MS’s to place at the disposal of foreign 
providers ‘points of single contact’. Service providers from other MS’s can receive all 
necessary information and complete all compulsory procedures through a single point of 
access.  
Authorization schemes are subjected to a test of non-discrimination, ‘necessity’ and 
proportionality.  The same test applies to the requirements, an excessively wide concept, even 
catching non-discriminatory ones with no effect on trade. Notably, the black-list of national 
measures imposing on the freedom to provide services, art16 (2) SD, has only four tolerable 
restriction grounds. So, the lenience for objectively justified reasons to restrict cross-border 
temporary services is more stringent than for establishment.  
A rule inventory of national laws and regulations vis-à-vis services took place as part of the 
implementation process of the Services Directive in order to ensure that they were in line with 
EU laws and jurisprudence. A separate ongoing notification procedure remains, when new or 
altered requirements are introduced by the MS’s after the deadline of the adoption period, to 
ensure that no new non-justified hindrances to intra community trade on services arise. 
Purpose  
The Services Directive is intended to truly unify the services sector within the EU. Due to the 
Directives inventive design, it is a staggering and fundamental shake-up of the single market. 
As a conventional legal instrument and governance device constituting control, the Services 
Directive is of a two-edged character.
83
 The SD introduced a lot of different procedures and 
processes that are mandatory for the MS to adopt and follow.
84
 Thus the MS had to truly 
assimilate the relevant jurisprudence after a long lingering period of resistance. This is a vital 
point as in a Community run by the rule of law, judgments of the Court must be fully 
complied with by the MS’s in order to guarantee that the fundamental principles of the Union 
will not be compromised. The following principles deserve special attention; 
 Individual rights,   
 legal certainty,  
 equal treatment of the diverse conditions under which market participants function in 
different parts of the EU,  
The balance of rights and obligations of MS’s under the Treaties are dependent on this.85 One 
has to give credit where it is due; the Directive has accomplished this to certain extent as well 
as simplified the internal market both for providers and recipients of services.  
 
                                                 
83
 Neergaard, U. (2013). Wiberg, Maria: The EU Services Directive – Law or Simply Policy? Europarättslig 
Tidskrift nr 4/2013, p 881 referring to Wiberg, M. (2013) The EU Services Directive – Law or Simply Policy?, p 
23.  
84
 Wiberg, M. (2013, February 6). The EU Services Directive – Law or Simply Policy?, p 24 et seq. 
85
 Commission, Europa.eu, 2005 p 1. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-05-482_en.htm 
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Risks 
In order for the internal market to function in practice; its legal framework ought to be of 
great quality at both EU and national level. The Services Directive misses the mark a bit due 
to the poor quality of the legal text. It contains inconsistencies in relation to the internal 
market freedoms in the Treaties and within the Services Directive itself.  
In case of uncertainties of interpretation and possible contradictions with the Treaties, the 
Directive must be interpreted and implemented in the context of the Internal Market 
freedoms. This may cause conflicts with Primary Law due to the many textual ambiguities 
within the Services Directive. Some problems are also caused by the fact that the Services 
Directive has been transposed into the national laws of the MS’s by the method most suitable 
for each individual state. Therefore, differences between MS’s national laws frequently occur. 
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3. Sorting out the Services Directive 
3.1 The scope of the Services Directive 
The Services Directive sets a general legal framework for how both cross-border provisions of 
services, either temporary or through establishment, should be dealt with by MS’s of the EU 
and also European Economic Area (EEA). Service, within the meaning of the Services 
Directive, comprises ‘any self-employed economic activity, normally provided for 
remuneration, as referred to in’ art 57 TFEU. 86 This definition is constructed of three parts; 
 Self-employed 
 Economic services: art 2(1) SD. 
 Referred to in art 57 TFEU. Otherwise within the scope of art 57 TFEU. 
First of all, the target of the Services Directive are self-employed, not really workers. 
Secondly, the services must be of an economic nature, characterized as offering services on 
the market for remuneration or consideration.
87
 And finally, the definition of services in art 57 
TFEU is mentioned as a reference. A non-exhaustive list explanatory in nature from art 57 
TFEU is continued by the 33rd recital of the Services Directive. 
A closer look at the Services Directive reveals that it has a material scope, personal scope and 
territorial scope.
88
 For the sake of clarity the Directive will be dissected using these 
components. 
The material scope 
The material scope includes the following main parts: 
1. Economic services 
o Services and goods 
The borderline between goods and services can be quite fuzzy. Sale of goods on internet
89
 
as well as license’s for a manufacture of goods fall under free movement of goods, not 
services. Usually tangibles are classified as goods and non-tangibles as services. Under 
certain circumstances this differentiation is not watertight.
90
 When two freedoms relate to 
a matter at hand the deciding factor is the gradation of relevance between those two 
freedoms. The freedom which is of most relevance prevails. 
91
 Retail, distribution and 
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 See e.g. C-322/01, Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v 0800 DocMorris NV and Jacques Waterval ECR I-
14887, paras 65, 76 and 124 and C-108/09, Ker-Optika bt v ÀNTSZ Dél-dunántúli Regionális Intézete 
ECR[2010] I-12213. 
90
 See e.g. C-275/92, Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v Gerhart Schindler and Jörg Schindler, 1994 and C-
108/09, Ker-Optika bt v ÀNTSZ Dél-dunántúli Regionális Intézete ECR[2010] I-12213. 
91
 See C-108/09, Ker-Optika bt v ÀNTSZ Dél-dunántúli Regionális Intézete ECR[2010] I-12213, paras 43 and 
46.  
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aftersales services ought to be treated as services, as long as goods in casu are subordinate 
to services. 
92
 
2. Requirements, restrictions and barriers 
o Requirements 
Requirements by MS’s can be challenged by the Services Directive when they ‘affect 
access to or the exercise of a service activity’.93 
o Discrimination v market access 
 
The Services Directive gives slightly conflicting signals on which approach should be 
used. Recitals 9 and 65 SD implies a discrimination approach, a removal of 
restrictions given that they are discriminatory. ECJ jurisprudence 
94
 as well as recital 
69 SD argues in favor of a market access approach with the removal of all non -
justifiable measures constituting a hindrance for cross-border movement of services.
95
 
Given some consideration, the market approach seems more likely having support in 
the Services Directive 
96
 as well as from the practice of the ECJ.
97
  
 
3. Exclusions, limitations and derogations 
o Exclusions 
 
Additionally to non –economic services, goods and non-discriminatory hindrances, an 
assorted amount of general derogations have also been squeezed into the Services 
Directive. The main ones are assembled in arts 2(2) and 2(3) SD. These include, e.g., 
SGI’s98, temporary work agencies,99 field of taxation, 100 official authority 101 and the 
legal subject matter for this thesis, the healthcare exemption art 2(2) (f). 
 
o Limitations 
More ‘limitations’ are spelled out in arts 1(2)-1(7). Inter alia, aspects of SGEI’s are 
ruled out, as well as privatization of public service providers, state aid and ending of 
monopolies.
102
 Labor law, a sensitive area in light of Viking
103
 and Laval
104
, should 
                                                 
92
 Recital 33SD and Barnard, C. (2008), Unravelling the Services Directive, Common Market Law Review 45, 
pp 334-335. 
93
 9th recital SD. 
94
 C-76/90, Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd. [1991] ECR I-4221. 
95
 Barnard, C. (2008), Unravelling the Services Directive, Common Market Law Review 45, p 339. 
96
 E.g. art 9 (1) SD, 16(1) SD. 
97
 Intrepreting article 20(2) of the Services Directive. Stockholm, Sweden: National Board of Trade. 
98
 Art 2(2) (a) SD. 
99
 Art 2(2) (e) SD. 
100
 Art 2(3) SD. 
101
 Art 2(2) (i) referring to art 45 TFEU. 
102
 Art 1(2)-1(3) SD. 
103
 C-438/05, The International Transport Workers' Federation and The Finnish Seamen's Union [2007] ECR I-
10779. 
104
 C-341/05, Laval Un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] I-11767. 
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also be mentioned as not supposed to be affected by the Directive.
105
 According to art 
3(2) SD private international law, particularly in regards to contractual and non-
contractual obligations and consumer protection, is also outside of the scope of the 
Services Directive.  
o Subordinate to other directives 
There is a non-exhaustive list in art 3(1) SD that spells out the sub-ordinance of the 
Services Directive to other directives if clashes occur. Relevant for this thesis is ‘The 
Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications ‘(PQD).106 
o Additional derogations 
There is also an assorted amount of supplementary derogations. These include, among 
other, chapter III on the subject of freedom of establishment and arts 17 and 18 SD on 
the subject of free movement of services. 
The personal scope and the territorial scope 
The legislative grounds for the Services Directive are arts 53 and 62 TFEU. Art 53.1 TFEU 
mentions particularly the implementation of directives in order to ease the embarkation and 
pursuance of activities of the self-employed in regards to establishment.  
 
Art 62 TFEU covers all Treaty arts in regards of chapter 3, Services. Since the Services 
Directive applies to Service providers,
107
 arts 4.1 and 4.1 SD definitions of ‘service’ and 
‘providers’ melds the definition of service providers, being physical or legal persons offering 
or providing services, that are nationals of a MS of the EU.
108
 An identical mechanism also 
functions for the recipients of services. As such, both consumers and businesses which use 
services in the course of their activities are encompassed by the definition.
109
 All the twenty-
eight EU MS’s as well as the EEA countries are within the territorial scope of the directive.
  
3.2 Discrimination prohibition 
The concept of non-discrimination in EU Law means that similar situations should be dealt 
with in similar ways and situations that differ should not be treated equally.
110
 Discrimination 
may occur both directly and indirectly.  
 
                                                 
105
 Art 1(6) SD. 
106
 Commission, Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on 
the recognition of professional qualifications (OJ 2005 L 255), 2005. 
107
 Art 2.1 SD. 
108
 The NA’s apply the SD widely without any concerns of the status of the employment. Fermabel gives a 
stamp of approval. 
109
 Commission, The Eu single Market, Services Directive Quick guide, 2013. 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/services-dir/guide/index_en.htm 
110
 Interpreting article 20 (2) of the Services Directive. Stockholm, Sweden: National Board of Trade p 3, 
referring to C-80/94, G. H. E. J. Wielockx v Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen [1995] ECR I-02493, 1995 para 
17. 
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The Discrimination prohibition in art 20 SD is divided into two parts. The first part in art 
20(1) SD is of the traditional vertical nature, laying down an obligation for the MS’s to ensure 
that no recipients of services is being discriminated on basis of nationality or residence. The 
second part, art 20(2), is of horizontal nature as it prohibits discrimination between the service 
provider and the recipient of the service. Different treatment by service providers of the 
recipients may be applied only to the extent that they are ‘directly justified by objective 
reasons’ e.g. a higher cost to the provider due to the service being provided in another MS.111 
The MS’s are obliged to serve in the role of guardian in preventing that horizontal 
discrimination occurs.  
 
The wording of the art 20(2) ‘general conditions of access to a service’ is wide, offering no 
specifics on what requirements should be caught by the provision. No other EU law definition 
for this wording can be found.
112
 
 
Most MSs seem to have interpreted art 20(2) SD as a market law provision, i.e. that the 
meaning of this clause is to ensure that the service is available to the public and that it is not a 
way to force the service providers to deliver a service.
113
 Consequently the article protects 
service recipients as a collective. They are represented by NA’s that has a duty to address the 
issue with a service provider if need arises to cease discriminatory deeds. Depending on 
national laws, individuals may also seek redress from national courts. Other approaches, like a 
contract law approach, may compromise the freedom to enter contracts, due to the possibility 
of an e contrario reading leading to an obligation for the provider of the service to enter into 
contracts against their will. An antidiscrimination law approach may affect the possibility for 
a service recipient to claim damages. 
 
According to NBT, a contract law approach would not be in line with recital 90 SD or the 
wording of the art 20(2) SD.
114
There is also a possible breach of the spirit of arts 16 and 17 of 
the Charter.
115
 The line between access and delivery cannot be set in stone though, as some 
services intrinsically connected to the service already provided e.g. aftersales services. 
Further, an antidiscrimination law approach is also unlikely on the grounds that the legal basis 
for European anti discriminatory law is typically art 18 or 19 TFEU. This is not the legal basis 
for the Services Directive. The Services Directive also covers legal persons, not usually 
covered by anti-discrimination law.
116
  However as there is no case law in this matter which 
approach is the right one remains uncertain. 
 
                                                 
111
 Commission, Guidelines on the non-discrimination of service recipients under art. 20 of the Services 
Directive, 2010. 
112
 SWD (2012) 146 Commission, Communication on the implementation of the Services Directive. A 
partnership for new growth in services 2012-2015 SWD(2012)146 final, SWD(2012) 147 final, SWD(2012) 148 
final, 2012 final,  p 9. 
113
 Intrepreting article 20(2) of the Services Directive p, 15. Stockholm, Sweden: National Board of Trade 
referring to SWD (2012) 146 annex II. 
114
 Intrepreting article 20(2) of the Services Directive, p 13. Stockholm, Sweden: National Board of Trade. 
115
 The non-Discrimination Clause in the Services Directive (a follow up on the National Board of Trade's 
intrepretation of Article 20(2) of the Services Directive), p 3. Stockholm, Sweden: National Board of Trade 
116
 Intrepreting article 20(2) of the Services Directive, p 14. Stockholm, Sweden: National Board of Trade. 
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3.3 The principles of Proportionality and Necessity  
Proportionality is one of the legal principles of EU applicable to both EU and MS acts. It has 
a key role in constitutional review of public acts as its function is of a least restrictive means 
test. Not only is the principle of proportionality used as an instrument for market integration, 
according to some views in the doctrine it also has a function as a protection of individual 
rights.
117
  
In the landmark case Cassis de Dijon
118
 the ECJ was of the opinion that requirements of 
minimum alcohol content for spirits enforced by German law were disproportionate as less 
restrictive means (LRM), as informing consumers by way of labelling could have been 
utilized.  
 
The AG Van Gerven
119
 in Grogan (Society of Unborn Children)
120
 elaborated further on the 
concept: to comply with the principle of proportionality, objective justifications should not 
have effect beyond that which is necessary. I.e. there is no alternative rule equally useful but 
less restrictive of the freedom to supply services that could be used instead. In Gebhard, even 
though the EJC does not use the term proportionality itself, further development of the 
principle occurred through the addition of a suitability dimension to the test. Hence, if a MS 
wishes to hinder or make less attractive one of the four freedoms, the measures in question 
must be non-discriminatory, justified by ORRPI, well suited to ascertain the attainment of the 
pursued objective and not go further than necessary in order to attain it. 
 
The degree to which a proportionality test is to be applied on the actions of the MS’s likely 
depends among other things on the level of harmonization achieved in the EU.
121
 The more 
harmonized a certain policy domain is, the less maneuvering space for independent action 
there seems to be for the MS’s.122 In casu, the Services Directive requires a full LRM test, i.e. 
what is suitable and necessary, would be used to determine whether and/or to what extent 
MS’s can limit the rights of service receivers/providers by governmental intervention 
motivated by public interests. Since all restrictive measures should be reviewed in light of 
their consistency with the Directive, especially in relation to art 16 SD, MS’s are left with 
very little leeway to create them. 
                                                 
117
 Tridimas, T. (2007). The General Principles of EU Law 2nd Ed . Oxford: Oxford European Union Law 
Library, pp 193-194 and Jan, J. H. (2000). Proportionality Revisited. Kluwer Law International, p 243. 
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 See case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis) [1979] ECR 649. 
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 See C-159/90, The Society for the protection of unborn children Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan et al [1991] 
ECR I-4685. 
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 See Sauter, W. (/2013 ). Proportionality in EU law: a balancing act? Utrecht: Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, p 15 
et seq., Tridimas, T. (2007). The General Principles of EU Law 2nd Ed . Oxford: Oxford European Union Law 
Library, p 193 and Graig, P. (2012). EU Administrative Law, 2nd Ed . Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 560 et 
seq. 
122
 Sauter, W. (/2013 ). Proportionality in EU law: a balancing act? Utrecht: Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, p 16.  
 28 
 
3.4 Requirements 
The definition of requirements is set noticeably wide in an attempt to catch everything that 
may be interpreted as a requirement unless specifically excluded that might affect the 
exercising of free movement in regards to services and establishment.  
According to the legal text in art 4.7 SD, “Requirements” mean 
‘any obligation, prohibition, condition or limit provided for in the laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions of the Member States or in consequence of case-law, administrative practice, the rules of 
professional bodies, or the collective rules of professional associations or other professional 
organisations, adopted in the exercise of their legal autonomy; … 
No consideration is given to if there is a de facto effect on the service providers or not. And in 
case there is an effect no differentiation between positive or negative effect is made.  
Herein lays the parallel to the vast Dassonville-Cassis
123
 doctrine for goods, casting a net too 
wide to function properly, as it catches rules not intended to be caught. Recital 9 SD thrives to 
put in some breaks, 
124
 e.g. some types of national rules are presumptively legitimate.  
Nevertheless, if they affect free movement of services, they will be caught by the Services 
Directive. This is clearly demonstrated in art 16 SD of the Services Directive that gives the 
impression that only four types of justifications are acceptable. 
However, in practice the broad range of possible methods described and covered, of a 
requirement being present, is appropriate t. The requirements are rarely found in the national 
rules due to their generic nature. A quick glance will not reveal the true nature of 
requirements, nor the requirements themselves, as the requirements are unseen behind the 
screen of the generic rule. Thus identification of non-justifiable restrictions demands a wider 
and deeper scrutiny of a large and variable number of provisions in the form of different types 
of documents connected to the national rules concerning provision of services. Usually these 
requirements are found in appendixes, annexes or application forms,
125
 e.g. a requirement of 
an interview demanding the physical presence of the person interviewed as part of the 
application process. Without doubt this type of obligation constitutes a hindrance for service 
providers from other MS’s for who it is more difficult and more expensive to participate than 
the nationals. 
3.5 The notification obligation  
A general notification obligation is set by the Notification Directive 98/34/EC
126
 as Lex 
generialis. Based on Directive 98/34/EC (the Notification Directive) art12.1 union acts that 
have specific notification procedure are considered as Lex specialis, i.e. the notification 
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 See case 8-74,  Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974]ECR 837 and case 120/78, Rewe-
Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis) [1979] ECR 649. 
124
 See joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard 
[1993] ECR I-6097.  
125
 According to Parinya Suvanavasin, jur kand, who did the evaluation process for the municipality of Umeå 
October 2012. 
126
 Commission, Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998 amending 
Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards 
and regulation. 
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procedure of these is independent of the Notification Directive.
127
 This is relevant to art 39(5) 
SD consisting of a specific notification vis-à-vis the Services Directive when new, or changes 
in existing, requirements for services and establishment that might affect provision of cross-
border services occur. Consequently requirements are notified by referring to 39(5) SD 
independently. Art 15(7) SD regarding establishment is a stand-alone rule, i.e. it does not rely 
on art 39(5) or on the Notification Directive. The form the notification procedure takes in 
regards of art 15(7) SD is optional to the extent that the MS notifying may choose to use the 
98/34/EC procedure or the art 15(7) SD procedure. Arts 16(1) & 16(3) SD do not mention the 
notification obligation. This does not mean that requirements in regards to temporary 
provisions of services need not be notified; instead the obligation depends on the art 39(5) 
SD.  
Due to the Services Directive arts 15(7) and 39(5) are both part of The Internal Market 
Information system (IMI), 
128
for simplification as well as uniform approach and procedure, it 
is preferable to notify all by the IMI. 
The notification method in practice is as follows; the designated NA makes an independent 
evaluation by looking first at a very specific requirement and then interpreting it in the context 
of the Directive as a whole, to make a correct evaluation if that requirement must be notified 
or not. Thereafter they send their evaluation of notification or non-notification to the NA that 
has imposed the requirement. The NA then downloads the notification in the Internal Market 
Information System (IMI) which has covered, since October 2013, the PQD and the Services 
Directive.
129
 The designated authority
130
 confirms the notification by pressing ‘enter’.  
3.6 The purpose of the notification obligation 
The purpose of the notification obligation is preemptive; to adjust national measures 
potentially consisting non-justifiable restrictions on the freedom of provision of Services ex-
ante, before EU internal market aquis is breached.   
The information gathered from the MS’s is also essential for the Commission to enable to set 
forth policy conclusions and evaluate what further initiatives should take place to improve the 
single market for the function of services.  
Other central policy actions related to the Directive will also continue to be actively supported 
and developed, particularly in the areas of administrative cooperation, non-discrimination and 
assistance to service recipients. 
                                                 
127
 See also Commission, Riktlinjer den centrala kontaktpunkten för anmälningsförfarandet  
98/34 och för de anmälningsförfaranden som föreskrivs i särskild EU-lagstiftning Part III p1. 
128
 Idbem, part II, p5 and  Commission, Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012il of 25 October 2012 on administrative 
cooperation through the Internal Market Information System and repealing Commission Decision 2008/49/EC ( 
‘the IMI Regulation’ ), 2012Annex, Provisions on administrative cooperation in Union  Acts that are 
implemented by means of IMI, referred to in art 3 p 1.  
129
 Commission, European Commission Internal Market. 
130
 See annex 2 for the designated authority in each MS. 
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The notification obligation even has a role to play as assessment example for the NA’s from 
the different MS’s to use as support and guidance on how to asses and justify similar 
restrictions if those arise. 
It is important to apply the EC/EU directives correctly; as the same system of sanctions also 
covers incorrect application of directives.
131
 The consequences for a MS for this type of 
failure can be harsh, ultimately taking the form of both lump sums & penalty payments.
132
 It 
is therefore sensible to screen national measures in order to avoid unnecessary risks. 
Proceedings on some MS’s, on the grounds of the improper adoption of the Services Directive 
have already been brought to the Court by the Commission, requesting the ECJ to impose 
penalty payments on those MS’s.133  
In Sweden all NA’s, including the Municipalities, are subject to the notification obligation. 
The Swedish transposition of arts 15.7 and 39.5(2) SD, take form in the Act of Services in the 
Internal Market 2009:1078 §2. According to §2 all new, or modification of existing, 
requirements directed at access to and exercise of a service activity must be notified to the 
NBT. The NBT does the interpretation of the National requirement while waiting for the 
answer from the Commission if it is in line with the provisions of the SD.  
NBT in the role of supervisor for the notification procedures in Sweden must be able to make 
an assessment of a proposed regulation and its eventual need for notification on its overall 
compliance with internal market rules. This assessment needs to be in a broad context that 
will cover all the individual cases, differing from the method of the preliminary rulings by the 
ECJ who´s preliminary rulings are based on individual cases by or through a specific 
condition presented to the Court. The Court will hence do its assessment of how this National 
act has affected the imminent situation within the framework of rules the petitioner has 
invoked. 
For a better understanding of how the NA’s work, samples of what kind of requirements they 
have to asses and analyze in their daily work is summarized in charts 1-3 (see annex 3) which 
covers all the decisions related to the area of healthcare.
134
  
I.e. the major problem for the national authorities, working by guidance of preliminary rulings 
by the ECJ, is the difference in interpretation of the subject matter. To outline a rule covering 
all individual cases a practicable formula has to be created made up of elements based on 
benchmarks set forth by the ECJ in the preliminary rulings made. When these are put in a 
broader context the formula should be applicable for determining when the SD and thus the 
notification procedure for services are applicable. 
 
                                                 
131
 See annex 2 for the designated authority in each MS. 
132
 See art. 260.3 TFEU read together with art 19.1 TEU ‘to ensure that in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaties the law is observed’ and C-304/02, Comission v France (fisheries conservation ) [2005] ECR I-
6263, paras 112-114. 
133
 See e.g. Commission, Press releases database, 2011 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1283_en.htm. 
134
 See annex 3 of this thesis. 
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Summary 
In short, the Services Directive‘s target-group is self-employed and performing economic 
services for remuneration within the EEA countries. Nevertheless, in practice the Directive 
affects all service providers no matter their size or structure.  Division into a material, a 
personal and a territorial scope is identifiable. The material scope covers the scope of 
economic services, requirements, and barriers. A market approach test seems to be the one 
applied by the Directive. 
Further a bunch of exclusions, limitations and derogations that have been squeezed into the 
Directive are listed and explained, as well as its place in the order of precedence of EU 
horizontal instruments (chapter 1). 
The Services Directive concept of requirements is extremely wide in a Dassonville-Cassis 
style. Even neutral and non-discriminatory requirements are caught by the web. The 
possibility of derogations is more limited with service providers who provide services on 
temporary basis, see art 16SD (chapter 3.4).  
To ensure that as few un-justified requirements as possible slip through the system a 
notification obligation to the Commission was introduced by arts 39.5 and 15.7 SD 
empowering designated authorities to assess on a case-by-case basis that any requirements, 
put in place by other NA’s, fulfill the non-discrimination principle,  are justified, necessary 
and proportionate ( chapters 3.5-3.6).  
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4. The exemption for healthcare according to the Services Directive 
4.1 Motives for the exemption of healthcare 
Initially healthcare was supposed to be part of the Services Directive. Art 23 in the 
Bolkenstein Draft was intended to codify and supplement the established case law of the ECJ 
on the free movement of services relating to healthcare: i.e. Kohll and Decker,
135
 Smits and 
Peerbooms,
136
 Vanbraekel,
137
 Müller-Fauré/vanRiet,
138
 Inizan
139
 and Leichtle.
140
  
The proposal was aimed mainly at the patient’s rights. Most MS’s had been reluctant to or had 
not implemented the relevant jurisprudence of the ECJ. As a result patients encountering 
unjustified or disproportionate obstacles for reimbursement of costs
141
 increasingly brought 
cases before national Courts.
142
 The proposal sought to ensure that patients seeking cross-
border healthcare would retain their rights to assumption of costs
143
 from their own MS. This 
was to be achieved by barring all authorization schemes applied to health-care service 
providers of extramural care in other MS’s by the patient’s own MS.144 
Some issues which the jurisprudence of the Court had left unclear were intended to be 
clarified for increased legal certainty and transparency. This covered MS’s and their social 
security systems as well as patients. Also, the European legislators would have been given the 
opportunity to deal with practical issues the jurisprudence had not dealt with.
145
  
However, since the content and scope of application of CoOP
146
 was not clearly defined the 
MS’s foresaw problems arising especially in relation to health services. There were serious 
concerns that the supervision of these services, to be carried out in accordance with the laws 
of the Member State of destination by the authorities of that Member State, would be at 
risk.
147
 As regards to SGI’s the scope of applicability of the Draft was perceived as unclear. 
Hence there was fear that the sovereignty of the NA’s could be compromised, particularly by 
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restricting their freedom to act in matters concerning healthcare
148
resulting in a unsatisfactory 
situation vis-à-vis market forces and public interest objectives. 
As the original versions were proven to be a mission impossible for the European Parliament 
to agree on healthcare services were excluded from the Services Directive.
149
 Codification of 
patient mobility was pushed forward in time and to be dealt with by separate legislation
150
 
which eventually resulted to the Patient’s Rights Directive (PRD).151 
 
4.2  Art 2(2) (f) SD and recital 22 SD  
The Services Directive healthcare exemption was founded through art 2.2 (f) SD, which has 
the following wording:  
 
‘Healthcare services whether or not they are provided via healthcare facilities, and regardless of the 
ways in which they are organised and financed at national level or whether they are public or private.’ 
 
Quite obviously the phrasing tries to cover as wide a range of healthcare services as possible.  
From the wording of the art it can be read that the healthcare exemption covers all services 
that qualify as healthcare services.
152
 However, while the legal text of art 2(2) (f) SD is clear 
as day the Services Directive is not applicable to those services, i.e. the definition of 
‘healthcare services’ is left  in the dark. To establish the definition one must follow the path 
shown by the Courts rulings in Fermabel
153
 and Ottica,
154
 that art 2(2) (f) SD must be 
understood in light of recital 22 SD.
155
  
 
By application of a teleological and contextual interpretation of the concept of ‘healthcare 
services’ it can be determined whether, and to what extent, activities are excluded from the 
scope of the Services Directive. I.e. the matter is examined in the light of the context of the 
provision as well as its purpose and general structure.
156
 
 
First, in connection with the phrasing of art 2(2) (f) SD, attention should be called to the fact 
that the notion of ‘healthcare services’ adopted by the EU legislature is somewhat wide-
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ranging. It covers services pertaining to health of humans, regardless of if provided via 
healthcare facilities or not. Neither the structure of organization and funding at national level, 
nor if it is state or privately owned makes any difference in casu.   
 
Second, regarding the purpose and the overall structure of art 2(2) (f) SD, the fact that recital 
22 SD points out that the scope of the healthcare exclusion should encompass; 
 
‘healthcare and pharmaceutical services provided by healthcare professionals to patients to assess, 
maintain or restore their state of health where those activities are reserved to a regulated health 
profession in the Member State in which the services are provided’  
 
This recital deserves special attention.
157
 
Apparently, art 2(2) (f) SD read together with recital 22 SD sets two cumulative criteria that 
must be in place for the exemption to be applicable. Basically, the first criteria include both 
the ‘healthcare’ and ‘pharmaceutical services’. Guidance for analysis of what those two 
services consist of is the wording, ‘to assess, maintain or restore patient’s state of health’. 
The second cumulative criteria is that the services fall out of the scope of SD only if  the 
provision of those services is by healthcare professionals reserved to a regulated health 
profession in the Member State in which the services are delivered’. 
To create a better understanding of the healthcare exemption it is necessary to chart all of its 
building blocks. Assembled they constitute the exemption as a whole. The wording of art 2(2) 
(f) and recital 22, read together and broken down by the key meanings for individual 
assessment, results in the following criteria; 
 
 healthcare 
 pharmaceutical services (the prescription, dispensation and provision of medicinal 
products and medical devices) 
 to assess, maintain or restore patients state of health 
 to patients (this together with the above cannot be done without individual interaction 
between patient and the provider of the medical service) 
 to be provided by healthcare professionals reserved to a regulated health profession.  
4.3 Healthcare services in EU law 
A natural starting point for a deeper understanding of what would most likely be covered by 
basic healthcare services in the MSs of the EU is to establish the meaning of health and public 
health on a level all the MSs have in common.  
WHO defines health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being’.158 EU 
acknowledges this definition, 
159
 as the EU primary law has no similar simple definition of 
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health.  Instead art 168 TFEU explains EU policy on public health.  First, the subject of EU 
law in regards to public health is a human.
160
 Further, mental as well as physical healthcare 
are healthcare in EU.
161
 Prevention of physical and mental illness as well as diseases and 
threats to health are also covered. Another primary law reference on the matter of healthcare 
is art 35 of the Charter which mentions both preventive healthcare and medical treatment. 
Notably, neither art 168 TFEU nor art 35 of the Charter mentions wellbeing. 
In reality, the WHO definition is not overly useful as it is too wide in scope.  It even covers 
activities not identifiable as particularly healthcare, e.g. water quality and genetics, which is 
hard to apply in practice. Albeit healthcare services are in place to upkeep the public and 
individual health, only selected areas of health are included.  
The broad notion of healthcare services adopted by the Union legislature bears a likeness to 
the two faced god Janus.  One face is aimed at art 168.7 TFEU, which lays down that it is the 
responsibility of the MS on a national level to organize and deliver healthcare. While the 
other face points at the several rulings by the ECJ, removing any doubt about the Treaty 
provisions concerning free movement de facto encompassing national laws (NLs) on 
healthcare schemes. Art 35 of the Charter guarantees right for everyone to access treatment 
‘under the conditions established by national laws and practices.’ Hence, EU law has had a 
strong impact on the organization of national healthcare. However, defining national health 
policies is within the exclusive competence of the MS’s.162 Therefore healthcare schemes vary 
from MS to MS based on their political decisions, normative values and economic situations.  
The Services Directive provides one of the most precise definitions of healthcare on EU level. 
However, similar to healthcare services in EU, the Services Directive also sends mixed 
signals. Recital 22 SD hints at a narrow interpretation of the rule while simultaneously 
widening the scope to cover pharmaceutical services as well.
 163
  
Only activities strictly related to the state of a human patient fall within the healthcare 
exclusion related to the scope of the Services Directive.
164
 Also, according to the 
Commission’s handbook, services intended for enhancing well-being or to provide relaxation 
are left out of the exemption, e.g. sports or fitness clubs. Even though the Commission’s 
Handbook lacks a normative value the ECJ in Fermabel supported this interpretation.
165
 Thus, 
a line must be drawn between wellbeing and healthcare. Within this differentiation of 
concepts the prevention of disease must be fitted.  
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The dilemma is, as genuine healthcare is ‘to assess, maintain or restore their state of health’, 
when does well-being become healthcare and vice versa? Some cases of the Court have 
discussed the differentiation of wellbeing and healthcare in detail. Leichtle was about a 
German national travelling to a health spa located in Italy to receive a health cure. His request 
for reimbursement of expenditure was rejected. The grounds for rejection was that the 
relevant German law allowed only for reimbursement where a medical officer had considered 
it to be absolutely necessary for the cure to take place outside Germany due to better odds of 
success. According to the German law the health spa where the cure took place had to be 
listed in a Register of Health Spas. According to the ECJ, German law did have the 
parameters in place for the treatment to be considered as healthcare on condition that it took 
place under medical supervision and is followed by drawing up a medical report.
166
  
Fermabel was a request for a preliminary ruling from the Court, on whether day- and night-
care centers providing assistance and care to elderly persons was within the scope of the 
Services Directive. According to the Court, day- and night-care centers for elderly persons 
would be deemed as providers of “healthcare services” under the condition that their principal 
activities are ‘genuinely intended to maintain or restore the state of health of elderly persons’ 
and are provided by healthcare professionals.  
 
Thus for simplification, following in the footsteps of the Court in Fermabel, 
167
from here on 
the term ‘genuine healthcare’ will be used to cover healthcare within the meaning of the 
Services Directive. Interestingly, the Court did not base the condition of healthcare 
professionals on the PQD like in Ottica, but on the PRD.  
Ottica connects the protection of public health to healthcare services.
168
 The preliminary 
ruling was about an optician’s right to establish freely within Italy. The Italian law enforces 
certain geographical placement and mandatory distances of minimum 300 meters between 
pharmacies, according to Italian authorities this also applies to opticians.
169
  
A division of hybrid operations in two categories based on different functions performed that 
are intrinsically linked was made and discussed; 
 Opticians, who exercise an activity within the definition of healthcare and, 
 Para-opticians, outside of the scope of healthcare, due to their practice being of a 
commercial nature. 
AG Jääskeläinen in Ottica
170
 discusses the problem of drawing the line in hybrid 
organizations covering healthcare and commercial services. He pinpoints as a possible 
yardstick the predominant part of a service operation. According to AG Jääskeläinen the rule 
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for treatment of the issue must be drawn up on a case by case basis in consideration of if the 
para-optical part of the operation may be the predominant one, as well as in terms of the 
applicable national legislation.  
The ECJ confirms the above mentioned division of opticians into two sub-groups without any 
further elaboration.
171
 However the ECJ judged the healthcare exemption being relevant due 
to two facts: the opticians exercising activities covered by the protection of public health and 
the opticians in Italy being a regulated paramedical healthcare profession.
172
 
It is clear from these cases that the key to interpret healthcare services in EU Law is through 
the national laws in the MS’s. The definitions provided by EU legislation are general enough 
to be applicable to any way the national healthcare system is organized.  
4.4 The nature of healthcare 
Traditionally the starting point of healthcare has been of a negative concept, focused on 
managing illness instead of achieving health.
173
 The definition is a narrow concept of health, 
based on absence of sickness or injury healthcare. Hence healthcare seems to be mainly of a 
reactive nature, i.e. responsive to changes of health and focused on identifying these 
changes.
174
 The positive aspect, prevention of disease in line of art 168 TFEU is also part of 
genuine healthcare, must be interpreted strictly as both the Commissions handbook and 
Fermabel implies. They exclude enhancement of wellbeing and provision of relaxation from 
genuine healthcare.
175
 
Wellbeing and relaxation are terms describing a positive condition linked to a state of being 
healthy. Thus, by logic, enhancing and providing a stable, positive health condition does not 
improve a person’s clinical health, as the person is already regarded as clinically healthy. In 
the presence of, or with a suspicion of the presence of a negative condition the outcome is 
contrary and genuine healthcare comes into play. Under certain circumstances preemptive 
actions, such as halting the predicted occurrence of a serious negative condition to happen 
unless action is taken as part of genuine healthcare.  
Genuine healthcare generally covers the following: 
Assessing 
Need for a checkup by a healthcare professional is either initiated by a medical condition of 
some kind or through a regular checkup to ensure that a healthy person remains that way. 
Typical examples of the regular checkups are the regular screening of small children to ensure 
that they are developing normally or the systematic screening of breast cancer for women 
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after they have reached a certain age.
176
 Either way, no enhancement of a positive condition 
takes place, only an inspection to see if a possible negative condition is being present. If there 
is an ailment there will be also an evaluation of how it should be treated.  
 
Maintaining  
Maintenance of health and the stabilizing of a medical condition are two sides of the same 
coin; prevention of serious diseases and dealing with existing sickness. An example of the 
maintenance of health, as a preemptive action, is immunization against vaccine-preventable 
diseases.
177
 Vaccination prevents catching the infectious disease and transmitting it to the rest 
of the population. Stabilization takes place where the condition must be stabilized in order for 
a cure to be possible. Or if there is no cure, treatment may still prevent a person’s health from 
further deterioration, e.g. insulin treatment for diabetics or in the form of palliative care
178
 e.g. 
for cancer or HIV patients, enable a persons to have a decent quality of life 
 
Restoring 
Restoration of health can only take place if the patient already has a treatable negative 
medical condition of some kind demanding a cure. Hence, a medical assessment, treatment or 
a restoration of health is always connected directly or indirectly to a negative medical 
condition of some kind, demanding activity of a professional healthcare service provider.
179
  
 
People’s health is subject to changes over time. Persons do not seek healthcare unless there is 
a motivation behind it connected to a point in time: feeling ill, regular check up by 
pediatricians to ensure normal development of children, requirement of a health certificate 
from an insurance company etc. Interestingly enough, measures not seen as healthcare, e.g. in 
Sweden breast implants and Botox injections
180
, may become healthcare if something goes 
wrong. For instance, when a patient gets sick as a result of a non-healthcare procedure, the 
public health concerns suddenly become valid. 
 
Activity scope 
It is currently unclear if there is some minimum level of activity and focus necessary for the 
exercising of the service to be considered genuine healthcare. The AG Villalon in Fermabel 
took the stand that activities that have no greater impact on the content or quality of the 
service, such as solely monitoring patients or issuing of certificates, should not be 
automatically considered to be ‘healthcare’. Thus, the effort of the relevant personnel must 
have taken place at a specific stage for ‘genuine healthcare’ to be in place. Supervision is also 
included, the healthcare personnel must not necessary be the one preforming the activity as 
long as they have a supervisory role.
181
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Summarized  
Commonly the concept of genuine healthcare service is either directly or indirectly linked to a 
negative medical condition of a person at a relevant point of time. Some positive aspects also 
exist in form of prevention disease e.g. vaccinations even though the positive aspect is rather 
restricted excluding wellbeing on EU level. The range of what is considered to be healthcare 
varies from MS to MS. Even health cures in form of a spa treatment may be covered if it suits 
the parameters of healthcare set by national law.  
4.5 Pharmaceutical services 
The recital 22SD adds another dimension to the healthcare services; pharmaceutical services. 
However, the definition of ‘pharmaceutical services’ seems to be a carbon copy of the 
definition of ‘healthcare’. Both are therefore ambiguous with no guidance in the phrasing for 
a precise demarcation provided by the legal text. Accordingly, the arguments provided for the 
need to specify the basic components of the concept of ‘healthcare services’ are true also for 
‘pharmaceutical services’.  
Defining pharmaceutical services by logic involves provision of pharmaceutical care: 
According to Hepler and Strand “pharmaceutical care is the responsible provision of drug 
therapy for the purpose of achieving definite outcomes which improve a patient’s quality of 
life.”182 According to some doctrine183 most European countries still rely on this definition in 
their approach to pharmaceutical care. However, a uniform definition of pharmaceutical care 
across EU is not possible due to the differences in language and healthcare systems between 
different countries. 
Invaluable support for the definition of “pharmaceutical services” in Union law in context of 
the SD, as suggested by the AG Villalon,
184
 is found in PRD
185
 art 3.a) in the definition of 
‘healthcare’. When read together pharmaceutical services within the meaning of the 
directives SD and PRD consist of ‘prescription, dispensation and provision of medical 
products and devises’.  
4.6 To patients 
One way of defining a healthcare system is as a collection of encounters between persons.
186
 
So, as healthcare is provided by a person, who is a healthcare professional, to a person, the 
patient, there must be a link (the state of health) between the healthcare professional and the 
patient. A ratione personae interpretation of recital 22 SD in context of genuine healthcare 
provides that the service activity can only be performed in actual connection with the 
individual patient.  
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At least healthcare is an encounter between the healthcare professional and the patient. In 
reality there occurs a series of encounters of different stakeholders.
187
 The amounts of 
encounters vary, but they must all be connected to an individual patient’s state of health. An 
encounter may be accessing and analyzing a patients’ medical record. I.e. the healthcare 
provider has to have detailed individual information like the actual health condition of the 
patient, to asses, maintain or restore their state of health. 
The wording of art 22 SD is aimed at a case-by-case assessment based on individual 
condition. This fits the Court‘s judgments in line of healthcare, e.g. Watts188, Elnicov,189 
Peerboms
 190
, Fermabel and Ottica. Basically, this type of healthcare can only be exercised at 
the end of a distribution chain, no matter if the service is connected to goods or is purely 
service based.  
This means that supply, wholesale and delivery of medical products and devices is not 
healthcare but falls under the Services Directive.  
To avoid any misunderstanding of what is meant by ‘end of chain’, two process pictures, 
picture 1 Concerning services mixed with goods and picture 2 Purely services are included in 
this paper to illuminate the definition. The picture of services mixed with goods is in four 
segments. They are symbolizing the following: 
i. The supply/production of a product, e.g. a pacemaker. 
ii. The distribution of the device to healthcare service providers. 
iii. The provision of the medical product by a healthcare professional to the patient. 
iv. The receiver of the medical healthcare service /medical device/ medicine. 
 
 
 
 
 
Due to the more complex structure of the service sector, the process picture showing solely 
services has several layers. The end of the service chain may be realized in the three last 
boxes. There are four main process segments, and one receiver, the patient: 
i. Actual or possible medical issues or incidents initiating the need for healthcare 
services.  
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Figure 1 Generic supply chain example 
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ii. Delivery; may be booking a time, calling an emergency number or just showing up at 
a providers emergency reception etc.  
An evaluation of the patient’s status takes place. If one is made by a medical 
professional, a healthcare service occurs. This may be made by e.g. a nurse at a toxic 
center by phone or an ambulance medic when meeting the patient.  If the decision is to 
not proceed with further healthcare the end of chain is reached. Otherwise the patient 
will be processed onwards. 
iii. The healthcare professional meets the patient for an assessment or analyses the 
personal data of the patient. Several relevant healthcare professionals may be included, 
e.g. the doctor examining, the radiologist x-raying, the lab specialist analyzing the 
patients’ blood sample. If the decision is to not proceed with further healthcare the end 
of chain is reached. Otherwise the patient will be processed onwards. 
iv. Medical treatment is applied by healthcare professionals; the end of chain is reached. 
4.7 The relationship between art 2(2) (f) SD and PRD 
After clarifying what the terms ‘healthcare’ and ‘pharmaceutical services’ implies, the next 
concept to tackle is ‘healthcare professionals reserved to a regulated health profession’. Here 
the Services Directive leaves its readers in a state of doubt as it does not provide an 
explanation of the definition to support a consistent interpretation.  
 
The search for an answer leads to the PRD.
191
 At a first glance this might look like an odd 
choice since there is no explicit link between those two Directives. Both directives do share a 
partial scope, service receivers. Otherwise, their subject matter differs. The PRD is directed 
towards the individual patients receiving the healthcare and their rights. The SD, even though 
it also covers service recipients, has its main focus on the entire provision of services and all 
the requirements that may be targeted towards them.  
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Figure 2 Example of a service supply chain 
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De facto, art 2 PDR on the subject of relationship with other directives does not even mention 
the SD. It makes the impression that there are either no expected clashes between those two 
directives, or that the distinction between them is so quintessentially clear, that there is no 
need to separately establish an order of precedence. This is highly likely; after all the PRD is 
about healthcare, which is expressively outside the scope of the Services Directive. As such, 
there is no need to establish an order of precedence; SD and the PRD do not overlap. No 
mention of the PRD can be found in the Services Directive either. However, this is not 
surprising, considering the time sequence of their creation. It is important to remember that 
the first draft of the SD was supposed to include healthcare, but this was left out due to the 
heated arguments within the European Parliament, resulting in a lack of agreement between 
the MS’s. Instead, there was a common understanding that the matter needed a specific 
directive.  
 
Perhaps due to this connection through a common origin; the PRD being the ‘phoenix’ raised 
from the ashes of the termination of the healthcare clause in SD, the wording of art 3(a) PRD 
reflects the wording in recital 22SD. Preamble recital 22: 
 
“The exclusion of healthcare from the scope of this Directive should cover healthcare and 
pharmaceutical services provided by healthcare professionals to patients to assess, maintain or restore 
their state of health where those activities are reserved to a regulated health profession in the Member 
State in which the services are provided.” 
Art 3(a) in PRD’s definition of ‘healthcare’ is: 
‘healthcare’ means health services provided by healthcare professionals to patients to assess, maintain 
or restore their state of health, including the prescription, dispensation and provision of medicinal 
products and medical devices;’ 
 
Noticeable similarities in the wording are 
also visible in other provisions of these two 
directives. As further example is the art 1(2) 
PRD …‘to the provision of healthcare to 
patients, regardless of how it is organised, 
delivered and financed.’ which more or less 
echoes the contents of the legal text of the art 
2(2) (f) SD.  
Thus, the conclusion is that these two 
directives should be read together to patch the elements missing from the Services Directive. 
I.e. the PRD may be used as a complementary tool for the purpose of attaining a defined 
scope of the exemption of healthcare in the Services Directive.
192
 In Fermabel the Court 
compared the scopes and wording of the SD and PRD - if day-care and night-care centers for 
elderly persons are providers of “healthcare services” with their principal activities being 
‘genuinely intended to maintain or restore the state of health of elderly persons’ provided by 
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Figure 3 Definitions used for scoping healthcare services 
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a health professional they are within the scope of the healthcare exemption of art 2(2) (f) SD 
and land in the PRD.  
PRD integrates social policy goals to hard free movement law measures in order to achieve 
social justice goals where SD concentrates on trade, i.e. purely economic values. Ad valorem, 
the social objectives based on solidarity as represented by the PRD supposedly precedes the 
purely economic objectives represented by SD.
193
  
 
Signs of an escalated effort towards social objectives have been seen lately by judgments of 
the Court and the modernization of secondary EU legislation in several areas.
194
 Therefore it 
is rational that rights of the service receiver fall under the PRD instead of the Services 
Directive when healthcare is the object. Likewise, the healthcare service providers will be 
covered either by another directive, appropriate for the situation, or fall under Treaty arts 49 
and 56 TFEU. 
4.8 Hybrid operations 
The categorization of an undertaking that operates services is defined by ‘the principal part of 
the services offered ‘. This means that a spillover effect takes place, thereby rendering other 
areas of operations by the service provider irrelevant. This was established by Fermabel
195
 
and confirmed by Ottica which extended the spillover effect by using the term 
‘predominant’196 element instead of ‘principal’197. Explicitly, this type of wording is usually 
seen associated with competition law where predominance in one area affects the way the 
whole company is treated by EU legislation. The dominant part of the business operations 
may even spill over to another closely connected to it (think far-fetched analogically Tetra 
Pack II
198
). It may therefore be possible to analogically use the large amount ECJ case-law in 
the area of competition to define what is meant by predominant.
199
  
 
An example shall be used to shed light on the idea: A person wants to buy catering services to 
a party. In this case the person is a service recipient and looking for a provider of catering 
services. The person will then look for different options offered to receive the service. The 
catering service can be provided by very different type of undertakings. Like department 
stores, cafeterias, restaurants and specific catering companies. All the same, the setting of 
where the service is offered does not affect the nature of the service or the type of service the 
consumer is receiving. I.e. it is irrelevant for the type of the service itself if the service 
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provider offers other services as well that are not catering services as long as the predominant 
part of the activities preformed are catering services. The classification of the business itself is 
not affected.
200
 
 
This means that the entire 
operation of a hybrid company 
will be categorized depending 
on which is the predominant 
part of its operation. I.e. 
catering companies are 
caterers; small cafeterias 
whose major business in 
catering are caterers, 
restaurants whose business is 
mostly serving food at the 
restaurant are restaurants etc. 
What exactly is meant by 
predominant remains however 
unclear since the Court did not 
elaborate on this in any of the 
relevant cases. 
4.9 Outsourcing and distribution 
The formula applicable for categorization, of an undertaking operating services, is defined by 
the principal part of its operations. It needs to be established how far this principle influences 
different type of operations in relation to differences in structure, operation methods, purpose 
and the general context of the entire operations. The two main concerns arising are; the 
correct assessment of insourced services related to healthcare facilities and distribution 
services of medical products and medical devices. 
Does the categorization as ‘healthcare services’ cover situations where a worker of a third 
party outsourcer is brought in to work inside a company's facility on temporary basis, purely 
in a role other than healthcare? Three points can be put forward to argue that this is where the 
line should be drawn, i.e. the insourced working force should not be part of the healthcare 
exemption. 
 Since it is the healthcare operation in this case that is the receiver of the service, by logic, 
the same structure as vis-à-vis hybrid operations should be valid.  
 The fact that the people actually providing the service are hired by a commercial company 
other than the healthcare facilities. I.e. the work and time spent at the medical facility is 
not a main part of their work as a whole. 
 The workers are not healthcare professionals regulated by NL in the MS where the service 
is being provided. 
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 See picture 4. 
Figure 4 The establishment of predominant part of a service 
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One would think that these facts add up to the conclusion that they should be included within 
the scope of the Services Directive. This reasoning is also supported by the Commission 
Handbook
201
 which explains that services which are not provided to the health professional or 
to a hospital are not covered by the exclusion of healthcare, i.e. they are within the scope of 
the SD. 
The other question raised was, how the formula should be applied to the distribution of 
medical products and devices. I.e. if distribution of medical devices or products is ‘genuine 
healthcare’, i.e. ‘provided by healthcare professionals to patients to assess, maintain or restore 
their state of health’. In general, the ‘hybrid logic’ should also be valid in casu.  On basis of 
the Commissions handbook the provision and maintenance of medical equipment as well as 
the services of medical research Centers is within the Scope of SD as well. In conclusion; 
distribution services do not fall within the exemption of healthcare, i.e. they are within the 
scope of the SD. 
Summary: 
Political issues, one of them healthcare, were the downfall of the Bolkenstein Draft (see 
chapter 4.1). Hence, healthcare was excluded and is now codified in art 2(2) (f) SD that must 
be read in light of recital 22 SD to make any sense. Together they set two cumulative criteria 
which form the healthcare exemption: healthcare and pharmaceutical services which are 
provided by healthcare professionals assessing, maintaining or restoring a human patient’s 
state of health (chapter 4.2). Healthcare resurfaced in the PRD, art 3(a) essentially repeating 
and then developing the definition for healthcare further (chapter 4.7) by e.g. providing an 
explanation that pharmaceutical services are prescription, dispensation and provision of 
medical products and medical devices (chapter 4.5). 
WHO’s definition of health demonstrates that the concept of health is a much wider notion 
than healthcare, as many values linked to good health are not healthcare in a traditional sense. 
The EU public health concept is codified in art168 TFEU covering mental and physical health 
of humans. Art 168 TFEU is twofold, enforcing the MS’s to deliver and organize healthcare 
while leaving the choice of method and content of those to the MS’s (chapter 4.3).The 
purpose of this structure is to upkeep the health of the residents to the extent decided by the 
MS providing the healthcare based on the MS’s socio economic values. Consequently, there is 
currently a large variation in which healthcare services each MS provides.   
Healthcare services are, in accordance with the Services Directive and the PRD ‘to assess, 
maintain or restore their state of health’. Little case law exists for interpretation in this area, 
as the jurisprudence has mainly occurred within the healthcare system as recognized by the 
MS’s. Of cases bringing light to the subject Leicthe,202 Fermabel and Ottica stand out as 
benchmarks; the two latter ones concerns the Services Directive, clarifying that all service 
operators are to be categorized according to their principal part of operations. Hybrid 
companies will be deemed as healthcare services if the predominant part of the company 
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 Commission, Handbook on implementation of the services directive, 2007 p 12. 
202
 C-8/02, Ludwig Leichtle and Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [2004] ECR I-2641. 
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while personnel providing services other than healthcare in healthcare companies that 
outsource should not, as they are within the sphere of the company that hires them out 
(chapter 4.3). 
Healthcare is universally, either directly or indirectly, linked to a negative medical condition 
of a person at a relevant point of time. The concept does not cover enhancing wellbeing nor to 
provide relaxation. Some activity from the healthcare professional is required, at least by 
supervision of other personnel providing the service to be deemed as genuine healthcare 
(chapter 4.4). 
Thus, even though the healthcare system must have a link between the patient and the care 
provider it is enough that it is based on individual data on the patients’ health, no physical 
encounter is required. A purely manual function is not enough, thus healthcare will only occur 
at the end of distribution chain. Hence, distribution of medical products is not healthcare 
(chapters 4.6 and 4.7).   
 47 
 
5. Healthcare professionals of a regulated profession 
5.1 Healthcare professionals 
After clarifying the meaning of ‘healthcare professionals’ in context of the Services 
Directive, the next step is to delineate the meaning of the second cumulative requirement; 
’healthcare professionals’.  This must be accomplished in a functional way to enable a 
systemic process that NA’s may use in their work. Recitals in directives are not legally 
binding, however ECJ in Fermabel
203
 and Ottica
204
 confirmed that in casu recital 22SD is 
once again vital for interpretation of healthcare.  
According to the Commission handbook and the meaning of recital 22SD the healthcare 
exemption solely includes activities reserved to a regulated health profession in the MS where 
the delivery of the services takes place.
205
 But what is meant by ‘healthcare professionals’ 
and ‘regulated profession’?  
The SD offers some help in this matter in regards to regulated professions by referring to the 
definition in PQD 3.1a).
206
 However, no clue can be found how to define healthcare 
professionals. Fortunately the Courts judgment in Fermabel, by some creative use of the 
PRD, offers an example for how to accomplish this. Since the definition of ‘healthcare’ is 
incidentally reflected by art 3(a) PRD the definition of healthcare professionals in that 
directive may also be used. The PRD also has a definition of health professional in art 3.1(f) 
as well as an explanation of the meaning of the pharmaceutical services vis-à-vis SD and 
PRD. 
 ‘health professional’ means a doctor of medicine, a nurse responsible for general care, a dental 
practitioner, a midwife or a pharmacist within the meaning of Directive 2005/36/EC, or another 
professional exercising activities in the healthcare sector which are restricted to a regulated profession as 
defined in Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 2005/36/EC, or a person considered to be a health professional 
according to the legislation of the Member State of treatment; 
Not purely restricted to the PQD, this adds one more type of health professional. There are 
thus three different criteria or identifying traits: 
The first and clearest way to categorize a health professional is that he/she exercises one of 
the ‘sectorial’ medical professions which has professional qualifications that is automatically 
recognized in the whole EU.
207
  
The second option is to identify a ‘professional exercising activities in the healthcare sector 
which are restricted to a regulated profession as defined in Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 
2005/36/EC’.  
The third option is a ‘person considered to be a health professional according to the 
legislation of the Member State of treatment’.208 
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 C-57/12, Femarbel ASBL v Commission, para 36.  
204
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 Art 4.11SD.  
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 E.g. doctors, nurses and pharmacists. 
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However, for a deeper understanding to what is meant by regulated professions, the relevant 
provisions in PQD must be studied in depth. 
5.2 The relationship between the recital 22 SD and the PQD 
Since recital 22SD and art 4.11SD establishes that the healthcare activity must be performed 
by a healthcare professional of a regulated profession, in accordance to PQD. The interplay of 
those two directives is of considerable importance.
209
 Those two directives are 
complementary instruments that regulate different issues; hence, they must often be read 
together.  
The PQD is all about education and qualifications, whereas the Services Directive covers 
inter alia multidisciplinary activities, administrative simplification and authorization. In 
regards to the order of precedence, the Services Directive is subordinate to PQD by art 2.1(d) 
SD. The Services Directive addresses a ‘service provider’ (company or person) while the 
PQD addresses a ‘person’ as service provider. So, the subject matter of these two directives 
differ, the PQD being aimed at the individuals practicing a service, where SD looks at 
provision of services in general of all the branches within its scope and is aimed at 
requirements as a whole . 
The PQD and SD converge and the importance of parallel reading is required when the SD 
addresses regulated professions. Some professions are harmonized at EU level, i.e. the 
sectorial professions, thus being regulated professions in all the MS’s by default.210  
 
Non-sectorial professionals are assessed by the ‘generic system’211 basically functioning by 
the mutual recognition principle. The generic system groups professional qualifications into 
five levels in art 11 PQD so that they may be compared. The art mechanically stipulates these 
levels of qualifications based on the type and duration of training/education. However, if a 
difference of more than two levels exists between the qualification of the professional and the 
qualification obligatory in the host MS, the PQD does not apply.  
 
To understand what the concept of regulated profession contains for professionals of the 
‘generic system’, the essential elements of the definition in art 3.1(a) PQD has to be 
unraveled. Art 3.1(a) PQD is divided in two main parts that each has relevant key elements 
for this. The legal text in the first part one is: 
 
‘regulated profession’: a professional activity or group of professional activities, access to which, the 
pursuit of which, or one of the modes of pursuit of which is subject, directly or indirectly, by virtue of 
legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions to the possession of specific professional 
qualifications;
 
in particular, the use of a professional title limited by legislative, regulatory or 
                                                                                                                                                        
208
 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Cruz Villalón, C-57/12, para 25. 
209
 Commission, Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on 
the recognition of professional qualifications (OJ 2005 L 255), 2005. 
210
 PQD ch III. 
211
 PQD ch I of title III. 
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administrative provisions to holders of a given professional qualification shall constitute a mode of 
pursuit.
 ’ 212 
Followed by part two; 
‘Where the first sentence of this definition does not apply, a profession referred to in paragraph 2 shall 
be treated as a regulated profession;’213 
To begin with, the two main parts are distinct. Even though the second part is conditional on 
the first part not being applicable, both are independent in a way that each leads to an end 
result that the profession is de facto regulated. The first part of the art is complex. It can be 
divided in two segments, regulated professional in general and use of professional titles. 
These will be discussed separately. 
The first segment is a general instruction on the different methods through which a profession 
can be regulated. The structure of its text can be further dissected for extraction of its essence 
to ease comprehension. The three components that cause legal uncertainty due to lack of 
precision of their meaning are; 
I. a professional activity or group of professional activities subject to (i.e. what is 
restricted) 
a. access to which 
b. the pursuit of which 
c. or one of the modes of pursuit of which is subject 
II. requirement of possession of specific professional qualifications(i.e. what is required) 
III. restricted by virtue of legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions, directly or 
indirectly (i.e. how is the profession regulated) 
Component I, a professional activity: This concept is the starting point for my interpretation. 
A professional is a person engaged or qualified in a profession.
214
Art 1 PQD provides that the 
telos of the Directive is to establish a framework of rules to regulate the methods MS’s can 
restrict access to or pursuit of regulated professions.
215
 It is also apparent from the art 2.1 
PQD, that the Directive is supposed to be applicable to all nationals of a MS who desire to 
pursue a ’regulated profession’. 216 The activity must be exercised for remuneration or 
recognition as it is one of the criteria of services in the context of EU-law. Also, the 
employment status is irrelevant; the activities can be exercised as self-employed or 
employee.
217
  
Thus, the transition to component II follows, as ‘professional activity or group of professional 
activities’ by way of internal market aquis is the taking up or exercising of a professional 
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213
 Art 3.1(a) PQD. 
214
 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/professional. 
215
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activity that is conditional of possessing some specific qualifications. As to what those 
qualifications might be, art 3.1(b) PQD offers guidance to the definition of professional 
qualifications, which is; ‘qualifications attested by evidence of formal qualifications, an 
attestation of competence referred to in Article 11, point (a) (i) and/or professional 
experience...’.218 
Relevant professional qualifications may have been obtained by means of;  
 education/training,  
 a specific examination confirming the competence where no training has taken place,  
 professional experience within the field for three successive years or for an equal 
period on a part-time basis for the duration of the previous 10 years.
219
  
When combined with the word ‘specific’, regulated professions seem to be at the apex of the 
professional qualifications, as the ‘requirement of possession of specific professional 
qualifications’220 goes above and beyond what is expected of regular professional 
qualifications as there is a requirement of specificity.   
Component III of the first segment of the art 3 (1) (a) PQD, asserts that the professions may 
be regulated in several ways, by legislative, regulatory or administrative means either directly 
or indirectly. This provides the means by which MSs, when choosing what professions to 
regulate and the way to regulate, may accomplish this within the framework that EU provides.  
The second segment of the first part of art 3.1(a) PQD is about titles. The first and the second 
segments are not cumulative; the second segment merely provides an example of a mode of 
pursuit a regulated profession can take.  
A title is a way to identify and legitimize, a form of visible diploma, a stamp of approval 
which is distinctive of a specific skillset, know-how or attributes achieved a posteriori, a 
certain type of training, education or practice. An analogy can be made by professional title 
and franchising e.g. ‘McDonald’s’. For restaurants to be able to use the name they must 
upkeep a certain quality, the “Prospective Franchisees” must initially pass training,221 the 
workers must have certain training, the food has to have specific ingredients and certain 
qualities. Thus, franchising might be analogically close to a Barrister. Just like the franchising 
name, a title is a reserved and protected, since the access is conditional upon the possession of 
specific qualifications or for which the use of a specific title is protected, e.g. pharmacists or 
architects.
222
 
The second part is explicit, in need of no further study as it refers to a list in Annex I PQD, 
which names the professions encompassed by the rule. The important dilemma here is to 
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understand: What type of regulatory provisions, by the MS for a profession, step over the 
threshold so as to make the profession considered as regulated by EU aquis?  
The deciding fact is if the interpretation should be wide or narrow. The key factor seems to be 
specificity. 
5.3 The specificity of regulated professions 
Currently, there is no general, clear criterion of distinction for/of ‘regulated professions’. A 
patchwork of pieces of negatives (non-harmonized professions) and positives (the sectorial 
professions) combined with the case law of ECJ provide some pieces of the puzzle.  
There are several examples of case law about specificity of requirements. Inter alia, the Court 
has held that activities that contain a practical training component as part of a training 
necessary to access a profession, is not to be held equivalent to a barristers regulated 
profession.
223
 I.e. the French ‘maîtrise en droit’, an awarded LBB legal diploma, is not to be 
seen as equivalent to an Italian University’s awarded or confirmed. The “gap” between the 
different diplomas and the absolute criteria for becoming a barrister cannot be replaced by 
practical training. 
Further, professional duties do not by themselves found a ‘regulated profession’. In 
Peñarroja Fa the duties of court expert translators did not qualify as a ‘regulated profession’ 
set out in art 3 (1) (a) PQD.
224
 ‘Provisions, whose sole purpose is to establish to facilitate 
recourse to the services of professionals, whether members of regulated professions or not, 
and not to lay down rules governing recognition of a particular qualifications…Do not by 
themselves establish a ‘regulated profession’.225 
However, where there is a successful selection of a predefined number of individuals and a 
strictly time limited qualification is conferred, based a comparative assessment rather that 
absolute criteria this cannot be regarded within the meaning of art 3(1) (a) PQD as a 
professional qualification.
226
  
The Court in Rubino interpreted the art 3(1)(a) PQD as meaning ..;’ where the conditions for 
taking up or pursuing a professional activity are directly or indirectly governed by laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions requiring possession of certain professional 
qualifications, that activity constitutes a regulated profession. ’227 According to the ECJ the 
relevant qualifications can be, among other things, verifiable proof of formal qualifications or 
competence based on a specific examination short of prior training.
228
 Thus, the Court 
underlines the specificity requirement in situations of professional qualifications. 
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In Ottica
229
 the Court based the definition of a regulated profession on art 11(c) (ii) PQD. 
Hence, a natural link to regulated professions may be drawn to art 11(c) (ii) PQD.
230
 
Accordingly, a ‘professional of a regulated profession’, has completed successfully a training 
of a specific structure which includes: 
 Post-secondary level training of a minimum of one year, to which the entry has been 
conditional on meeting certain requirements.
231
  
 Additional mandatory training, if any, required. 
 
That ‘person’ must also hold a diploma from competent authorities certifying a successful 
completion of that training. 
 
Annex II PQD includes inter alia a non-exhaustive list of paramedical or child-care
232
 courses 
recognized as being of the specific structure that makes a profession regulated. By mutual 
recognition if a MS has a requirement of a specific training it may require equivalent training 
from practitioners of the profession from other MS’s. However, the list in remarkably short, 
e.g. accordingly only eleven of the twenty-eight MS’s seem to have specific training that 
leads to a regulated paramedical or child-care professional. The Annex II p1 list includes e.g. 
opticians, a paramedical profession regulated by more than half of the MS’s of the EU 
according to the list. What catches the eye is that many MS’s are not present on that list at all, 
e.g. Sweden.  
However, as demonstrated in Annex 
II of this thesis, the optician is a 
regulated profession in Sweden. 
Thus, Annex II of PQD cannot be 
relied on as a complete list of 
regulated professions.  Nevertheless, 
that does not mean that the 
definition itself cannot be utilized, as 
it provides a final and important 
piece to the puzzle of a more general 
definition of the ‘regulated 
profession’ as a whole, the 
specificity.
233
 
Based on the content of art 11 PQD, 
the Annexes of the Directive and the 
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Figure 5 Segmentation of the ‘profession’ definition 
 53 
 
general structure of the PQD, the specificity of   training/education seems to be of major 
importance and usually the key to the regulated profession.  The notion of specificity creates a 
link through art 13.2 PQD to art 3(i) (e) PQD, defining the notion of ‘regulated education and 
training’ as specifically geared to a certain profession and adds one more non-exhaustive list 
to look into. Art 13.2 PQD refers to Annex III PQD for regulated education and training at the 
level described in art 11 p(c) PQD. 
It can be established that “regulated profession” addresses the education/qualification 
necessary to actually perform the activity (“know how” - e.g. electrician, doctor, etc.). Also it 
is a matter of a regulated activity rather the circumstances under which the activity is 
executed.
234
 
 
Not all the particular details on how those 
criteria will be achieved are covered by 
jurisprudence as the choice of methods for 
regulation is mainly within the 
competence of national Law as long as 
they do not clash with EU law. As the 
Court has proclaimed in several cases the 
definition of ‘regulated profession’, for 
the purposes of the PQD, is a matter of EU 
law.
235
 As a result the healthcare 
exemption is formed not only by the SD 
and the PRD, but also by the PQD. 
236
 
5.4 Paramedical 
During the course of this thesis it has been established that according to jurisprudence, mainly 
Fermabel and Ottica, healthcare exemption can only exist if the healthcare services are 
provided by a healthcare professional.  Hence, a non-regulated professional selling a medical 
product or a medical device, e.g. Nicotine replacement therapy outside of a pharmacy is not 
healthcare but trade, i.e. not exempted on basis of art 2(2) (f).  
Chapter 5.3 above set that healthcare professionals (of a regulated profession) can be divided 
into two main categories, sectorial and those recognizable by generic evaluation.  
The healthcare professionals that belong to the sectorial professions are seen as medical 
professions proper (e.g. pharmacists), a term used by the Court in Eleftherios.
 237
 The 
paramedical professionals, e.g. opticians are subject to the generic evaluation. 
 In Ottica AG Jääskeläinen discussed the matter of paramedical professionals in relation to 
opticians at length. According to the Court opticians can be either regulated or not, but Italian 
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Figure 6 Definitions providing scope for healthcare exemption 
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law regulates opticians in general making it a regulated profession, therefore the court did not 
elaborate the matter further. 
In Venturini 
238
 the similarities between para-pharmacies and regular pharmacies were 
compared and assessed. If a paramedical service provider is too similar to pharmacies they 
will fall outside the scope of SD. I.e. the seller of a medical product must be clearly 
commercial and the services must be separable enough not to be ‘interchangeable’ with 
pharmacies, run by professionals of sectorial profession.  
This raises the question of; if and under which circumstances paramedical should be deemed 
to be healthcare professionals. As can be understood from the above the regulatory dealing of 
paramedical seems to vary between different MS’s so no unison EU wide rule exist.  
The paramedical sector is extensive and covers a broad range of different activities, e.g. 
physiotherapist and optician, and does not fall within the sector of medical professions 
proper.
239
 Thus, unlike the medical professions proper they do not automatically benefit of 
the sectorial rules automatically providing the status of a regulated profession. However, this 
does not mean that paramedical by definition avoid the system of mutual recognition of 
regulated professions as established by EU law.
240
 
5.5 Issues due to differences in how MS’s define regulated professions 
Four different types of approaches for the MS’s to regulate professions are acknowledged by 
the Commission Communication SWD(2013) 402 final;
241
  
 Regulated professions associated with reserved activities 
 Professional activities regulated through mandatory certification (the qualification 
requirement is not exclusively linked to a profession as such but to a specific activity). 
 Protected professional titles 
 Voluntary certification schemes 
With voluntary certification schemes it is slightly unclear where one should draw the line.
242
 
Private regulation has been assessed by the court and the signals can be slightly confusing. 
Obviously where the certification schemes are connected to bodies appointed or effectively 
controlled by the State it is considered regulatory.
243
 But, there is also a possibility that 
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measures by private bodies intended to regulate an activity in a collective way is included.  
This has occurred in the field of professional services.
244
  
Lastly, the ‘effect rationale’, i.e. that voluntary certification schemes, even though they do not 
fall under the system of recognition in PQD, may affect the market. This happens by them 
creating a necessity of certification to access some professional activities by favoring 
dominant professional associations.
245
 
Due to the difference of regulatory methods and choices regarding which professions to 
regulate some cross-border services might be deemed as healthcare in some MS’s and covered 
by the Services Directive in others. As an example, the Swedish system permits a person to 
exercise the activities of an optician without having an actual license
246
, granting the 
applicants do not call themselves licensed while performing their work. This system accounts 
for all regulated medical professions in Sweden except the following licensed professions: 
pharmacists, midwifes, medical doctors, dentists and prescriptionist due to their sole right to 
the profession. 
A certain amount of confusion may arise from a strict reading of art 14.4 PQD, when a 
professional, who is not part of the sectorial professions of one MS, moves/establishes 
“business” in another MS. This is due to the wording of art 14.4 of the PQD, that 
‘substantially different matters’ means matters of which knowledge is essential for the pursuit 
of the profession. It may then be interpreted as; none of the regulated professions where only 
the use of the title is regulated would then be possible to subject to compensation measures if 
the pursuit of the profession is not considered as regulated in the new host MS.
247
  
This type of uncertainties could amount to a severe disregard of the mutual recognition 
principle of the profession that a person has training for, resulting in a restriction to the 
exercising of a profession. This would most likely be disproportionate in line with the ECJ’s 
reasoning in Eleftherios.  
Partial hindrance, may however be justified under certain circumstances by ORRPI, consumer 
protection and health protection. That is why a MS can restrict access to the title (being a 
mode of regulated profession) but not to the exercise of professional activities the service 
provider has competence for and has proof of it from competent authorities.
248
 Sectorial 
professions function in a similar way.   
In Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali  
249
 the exercise of professional activities that fall 
under the title of architect was discussed in depth. The Court made two things rather clear.  
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1. It is the national legislation of the host MS that defines the field of activities enclosed 
by architects.
250
 However, the principle of mutual recognition in regards to the 
sectorial professions requires automatic recognition of persons having the 
qualifications and proof of this in a form of diploma by relevant authorities in the MS 
of Origin.  
2. If there are variations on the specifics, those persons must be allowed to pursue the 
activities of an architect even though the use of the title can be refused, until 
‘equivalence’ has been reached by the person in question by additional education or 
training. During that time period the person may either use the title from the MS 
he/she originates from or a title the host MS considers suitable.
251
 
Interestingly enough the Court actually used a likely cross-border situation, which was not the 
matter at hand, to analogically apply the rule for Italian engineers having the right 
qualifications and a legitimized proof of it by relevant authorities even though they did not 
bear the title architect but that of an engineer
252
wanting to practice activities of on architect in 
Italy. To be precise, since the cross-border element was only theoretical, the case was about a 
purely internal situation. Motivation behind this judgment was to address the issue of reverse 
discrimination, as the Court explicitly mentions.
253
 
Since a person currently cannot claim any regulated professional title without fulfilling some 
form of education, accreditation or other professional requirement it logically follows that the 
training in itself cannot be seen as exclusive. I.e. the title, even when regulated, is only 
provided after an individual fulfills the criteria for achieving it. The horse goes before the cart. 
Access to training for certain required qualifications for an individual may be restricted by 
national authorities by law or fact. Lawyers, not a regulated profession in Sweden will be an 
excellent sample. Law in Sweden can be studied at different type of faculties, inter alia; 
 Business Law, at the institutes of Economy and Management,  
 Administrative Law (förvaltningsrätt), institutes for Social Science and Faculty of Law 
 Law, at the Faculty of Law.  
These educations may take form of programmes or freestanding courses. But, only a 
successful completion of the programmes offered solely by the Faculties of Law
254
 give 
access to LBB which is compulsory to be able to access the title of a barrister or to pursue 
certain professions, e.g. judge of a national court. Several of the courses are offered only 
within the programme (e.g. criminal and process law) and cannot be accessed as free standing 
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courses in Sweden. So, the only way to access the LLB is by finishing one of the specific 
programmes aimed at providing access to the regulated Barrister title. Thus, there is a de facto 
exclusivity on some qualifications.  
Further, due to the restrictive way the definition of ‘regulated education’ in the PQD is 
constructed
255
 closing out even education and training recognised by a MS as relevant for a 
regulated profession, without the specific aim of pursuing that profession, can be deemed as 
nonspecific. This means that persons possessing similar/same skills can be categorised 
differently.  
Additional issues may be caused by part of the legal text of the PQD being lost in translation. 
This can be demonstrated by the Swedish and German language versions, differing in a 
relevant aspect from the others; they seem to be the only ones where the word ‘or’ is changed 
to ‘and’.  Also the whole aspect of administrative provisions is left out from these two 
versions. In the text of eleven languages compared (English, French and Italian, Polish, 
Dutch, Estonian, Danish, Spanish and Finnish), the method of regulation is by virtue of 
legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions. Since the definition of method of 
regulating professions is not complete, there is a risk that a healthcare professional could be 
wrongly assessed as not regulated. 
5.6 The public health concerns 
Health professions have a special role from several aspects. Public health concerns seem to 
have a heavy duty role to play as regards the economic means test, i.e. in connection with 
mixed nature of paramedical activities; the rulings of the ECJ intricately point toward a 
preference to assess the activities at hand under the Treaty regulations instead of the SD. So 
far the cases concerning activities of a mixed nature, healthcare and commercial, have either 
had no mention of the Services Directive,
256
 have been deemed as healthcare
257
 or the Court 
has left it for the National Courts to decide.
258
 
Fermabel mentions, in reference to recital 7SD, that due to the wide range of services covered 
by the Services Directive, a careful balancing should be made with insight into the distinct 
feature of the activity and general interest objectives, particularly mentioning those linked to 
public health,
259
 when evaluating if activities are healthcare or not. 
Ottica clearly marks this link with activities of assessing, maintaining or restoring the state of 
patient’s health and the protection of public health. Accordingly, these activities should be 
performed by healthcare professionals proper or paramedical. Thus paramedical of a more 
commercial nature are subject to a nudge towards the genuine medical healthcare where 
assessments are being made.  
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In Venturini, the persons preforming the services being pharmacist providing services in form 
of retail sales of medicines in para-pharmacies, strengthens this link further.
260
  
Recapitulated, the main idea is that ‘end of distribution chain’ activities, which may raise 
issues of public health, connected intrinsically to the performance of the service itself, would 
usually not be assessed under the Services Directive. That is why those services are usually 
(in many MS) connected to requirements targeted at the person providing the service 
possessing certain qualifications. Here however the line between services and goods can 
become a little vague as the classification of the goods, let's say, a medical x-ray device, 
reflects to nature of the service, the operation of X-ray apparatus being reserved for 
professional radiographers. The mentioned setting does not however lead to the service 
necessary being healthcare. I.e. sale of painkillers in supermarkets, for that to be considered 
healthcare the person engaged in the activity must be a healthcare professional.  
Some countries are even of the opinion that there should not be a partial access to health 
professions as there is greater risk posed in relationship to the service provided. As well as the 
possibilities of misinformation regarding the professional activities’ restricted nature to the 
patients, public in general and other service users.
261
 Consequently, for the providers of the 
healthcare services, if any lack of clarity of the nature of the service exists and there are 
public health concerns involved the Services Directive is unlikely applicable. 
5.7 Reflections and Demarcations 
Health services should be provided by healthcare professionals according to recital 22SD or 
the 3.1(f) PRD in accordance with Fermabel and Ottica. However, neither the Services 
Directive, the PRD or the PQD specify what formal skills health care professionals should 
have.  
That is why a case-by case assessment has to be done. In the case of a regulated profession, 
the provisions relating to the regulation demonstrate whether it is a health-care profession or 
not. Fermabel extended the coverage of healthcare professional to a larger group. 
Accordingly, if the profession is not regulated by virtue of PQD, but the person is 
nevertheless recognized as a health professional in accordance to the legislation of MS where 
the treatment is provided, consideration must be taken to the occupational description of the 
relevant MS and to the services that are provided by the professional group as a whole, which 
requires a special evaluation of the activities they conduct.
262
 (Chapter 5.1 and chapter 5.2) 
Lacking a clear general criterion in the current state of EU law, the key to regulated 
professions seems to be ‘specificity’.263 I.e. a person must have a certain specific 
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education/qualification necessary to actually perform the activity (“know how”) and has to be 
able to prove it. On top of the ‘iceberg’ are the sectorial professions benefiting from automatic 
mutual recognition.  It seems absolutely clear that the definition falls under EU’s competence, 
but just as regarding healthcare, it is the MS’s who choose which professions to regulate. 
Thus, the variety of regulated professions within EU is wide (chapter 5.3). Currently four 
types of ways to regulate professions are deployed by the MS’s of the EU: by protected titles, 
activities regulated through mandatory certification, regulated professions associated with 
reserved activities and certification schemes that are voluntary. There are several issues 
connected to the way the rules are written in combination with some strict reading of the rules 
potentially causing professionals of regulated professions not to be categorized as such 
(chapter 5.5).  The Directive 2005/36/EC however is being updated.
264
 The updates most 
relevant for healthcare professionals linked with the Services Directive is that they will be 
automatically excluded from the SD.
265
 The deadline for implementation to national laws is 
18 November 2016. 
Differences of classification are at a zenith for paramedical, as Ottica visualizes by discussing 
different types of opticians (chapter 5.4). If opticians would have not been a regulated 
profession in Italy they might have fallen under the Service Directive. Then again, a link with 
public health concern seems to have resulted in quite the opposite, corresponding to Venturini 
(chapter 5.6). As these concerns are of great weight in assessment of healthcare activities in 
regards to public health concerns, when such a link exists, the case will most likely be 
assessed under the relevant Treaty art instead of the Services Directive.   
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6. Reflections, analysis and conclusion 
6.1 Reflections 
6.1.1 The Services Directive and its purpose 
The Services Directive is a joint regulatory system that covers all service sectors that are not 
specifically excluded from it. The Directive addresses both temporary provision of services 
and establishment. Rules on administrative simplification and cooperation of NA’s, between 
and within MS’s are introduced. An excessively wide scope for the requirements, bound to 
catch non-discriminatory requirements with no effect on the trade, are subjected to a test of 
non-discrimination, ‘necessity’ and proportionality.  
The tolerance for objectively justified reasons to restrict cross-border temporary services is 
narrower than for establishment. (See Chapter 2.4)  
The Services Directive is a legal instrument and a tool for control, forcing the MS’s of the EU 
to undertake a continuous review of national laws and regulations to make certain that they 
are not in a contradiction with EU law and practice. With the implementation of the Directive 
the MS’s had to truly assimilate the relevant jurisprudence after a long lingering period of 
resistance. This was a vital matter, as the Community is run by the rule of law and the 
judgments of the Court must be fully complied with by the MS’s so as fundamentals of the 
Union will not be compromised. Individual rights,  legal certainty, equal treatment of the 
diverse conditions under which market participants function in different parts of the EU, also 
the balance of rights and obligations of MS’s under the Treaties are dependent on this.266  
The Directive has accomplished this to a certain extent as well as simplified the internal 
market for both for providers and recipients of services.  
A separate ongoing notification procedure, when new or altered requirements are introduced 
by the MS’s after the deadline of the adoption period remains, to ensure that no new non-
justified hindrances to intra community trade on services arise. 
6.1.2 Risks 
In order for the internal market to function in practice, its legal framework ought to be of 
great quality at both EU and national level. In the blink of an eye it can be deemed that the 
Services Directive stumbles a bit there due to the sometimes poor quality of the legal text; 
inconsistencies occur both in relation to the internal market freedoms and within the Services 
Directive itself. In case uncertainties of interpretation and possible contradictions with the 
Treaties occur, the Services Directive must be interpreted and implemented in context of the 
internal market freedoms. This situation may well take place due to the textual ambiguities 
within the Services Directive. Some problems are also caused by the fact that the Services 
Directive has been incorporated into the National Laws of the MS’s by the method most 
suitable to them from a national perspective. This leads to differences in interpretations and 
implementation in national laws between the MS’s. 
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A good example of a contradiction is the healthcare exemption that is the subject of this study. 
The art 2.2(f) SD only mentions healthcare, however recital 22SD ads pharmaceutical 
services to healthcare, thus, they do not match.  Even though a certain amount of ambiguities 
are most likely intentional with the purpose of providing a certain scope for interpretation 
based on normative differences between MS’s national legislations,267 though in regards to the 
Services Directive the number has overstretched. 
6.1.3 The Services Directive healthcare exemption  
Provision of healthcare in EU is a huge service sector, and on the rise as the population is 
aging. However, due to its nature, social objective as well as inter alia public health concerns, 
it was left out from the Services Directive. The exemption for healthcare is founded by art 
2(2) (f) SD, which lists what the exemption covers, but lacks any kind of definition for what 
constitutes healthcare services.  
Art 2(2) (f) SD specifies the circumstances where the Services Directive is not applicable. 
Recital 22 addresses what ‘healthcare’ is in context of the Services Directive, and it 
recognises that both ‘healthcare and pharmaceutical services’ are covered by the exemption. 
This is followed by an explanation that the concept of ‘healthcare’ is conditional on that those 
service should be ‘provided by healthcare professionals to patients’. Also specific 
circumstances for the exemption to stand are added; ’to assess, maintain or restore their state 
of health’ and ‘reserved to a regulated health profession in the Member State in which the 
services are provided’. These terms must be interpreted first autonomously and then together 
as a whole in a wider context. 
6.1.4 Healthcare services in EU law 
Healthcare can be found in art168 TFEU, covering mental and physical health. The data 
collected points to the concept of healthcare covering human health only. (Chapter 4.2) Since 
the concept does not cover enhancing wellbeing or the provisioning of relaxation healthcare, 
it is either directly or indirectly linked to a negative medical condition of a person at a 
relevant point in time. Provision of healthcare is provided by a person to a patient and is 
divided in three categories: 
 Assessment - an inspection of a negative condition either being or not being present. If 
needed, evaluation of possible treatments is included. (Chapter 4.4) 
 Maintenance - Maintenance of health or stabilizing a medical condition. Also actions 
with a preemptive purpose are covered e.g. vaccines. (Chapter 4.4) 
 Restoration - treatment of a negative medical condition of some kind. (Chapter 4.4) 
For “pharmaceutical services” no EU level definition was found. Thus they are deemed to be 
prescription, dispensation and provision of medical products and devises in line with the PRD 
art 3.a). 
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6.1.5 Patients’ Rights Directive (PRD) 
To understand the “healthcare” concept in a wider context one must read the healthcare 
exemption in light of the PRD which contains specific provisions regarding healthcare.
268
  
As explained earlier (Chapter 4.7) even though the PRD only covers recipients of healthcare 
services on a temporary basis, the remarkably similar wording of recital 22SD and art 3.a) 
PRD can be used to unravel the healthcare exemption of the Services Directive. This was 
done in Fermabel, which did not even mention the PQD. However Ottica does mention PQD 
and since SD and PRD both mention PQD it is of essential value. 
 PRD also provides the explanation for ‘pharmaceutical services’ as well as ‘healthcare 
professionals’. For the final piece of the puzzle, the PRD just like the SD refers to the PQD 
for a definition of a healthcare professional of a regulated profession. 
6.1.6 Professional Qualifications Directive (PRQ) 
The last legal instrument relevant to healthcare exemption in SD is the PQD. If the healthcare 
services are not provided by members of a health profession regulated nationally by the 
relevant MS they will be covered by the Services Directive. Art 4(11) SD refers to the art 3(1) 
(a) PQD for the definition of regulated professions. The PQD addresses the person providing 
the services and the qualifications that person possesses. Both the object of restriction 
‘regulated profession’ and the different type of regulative methods that are deemed to be as 
‘regulated’ are covered by the art 3(1) (a) PQD. The definition of ‘regulated profession’ for 
the purposes of Directive 2005/36 is a matter of Union law.
269
 The MS’s decide which 
activities are reserved to a regulated health profession within their jurisdiction. I.e. which 
professions they at least partially regulate. There is not a clear criterion of what really is a 
‘regulated profession’ but from EU jurisprudence the requirement of specificity of the 
acquired skills is the key feature as have been presented in chapter 5.3 of this thesis and case 
law- e.g. Ottica, Rubino, Perranoja Fa. 
The new amended PQD recital 30 puts an end to the legal uncertainty in regards to what is 
adjudged regulated healthcare professionals by clearly stating that healthcare professionals 
(notice the absence of the word regulated) are not covered the Services Directive.
270
  
6.2 Discussion and analysis 
Janus, the god of transitions looking at the same time both into the future and he past, does 
not only symbolize the normative plural nature of the EU law in general, the same pluralism is 
very much present in the exemption of healthcare.  
It is the EU that defines the definitions applicable to healthcare as a ‘regulated profession’, 
but it is the MS’s that regulate which healthcare is appropriate and what type of ‘healthcare 
professionals’ are regulated. This legal pluralism reflects how the legislative tools are 
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applicable in the MS’s, and indubitably leads to national differences in treatment of the scope 
of the Services Directive. This is of course how the EU works due to different legal cultures 
and the choice each MS makes in to what extent different aspects of health services are being 
regulated. An attempt for a more unified viewpoint on what is the correct legal tool applicable 
for healthcare professionals is reflected in the Draft of the PQD recital 30 which puts the cat 
on the table
271
 by exclaiming that ‘healthcare professionals’ are not covered by the Services 
Directive.  
It is no wonder that the MS’s could not agree to the Bolkenstein Draft’s healthcare legislation; 
the wide coverage of cross border extramural care for consumer concept was too far reaching 
for the MS to sign. Eventually the healthcare boomeranged back in form of the PRD which 
now also may be used as an interpretation tool for the healthcare exemption in the art 2.2(f) 
SD in support of recital 22 SD.  
6.2.1 Interpretation of Art 2.2(f) SD 
Art 2(2) (f) SD must be read in light of recital 22 SD. These establish two cumulative criteria 
of the healthcare exemption. After Fermabel and Ottica, both the PRD and the PQD must be 
studied where relevant. Their interaction with the Services Directive as well as the order of 
precedence of these horizontal legal instruments must be established.  
The scope of the exemption of healthcare exists on three planes; SD, PRD and PQD, as well 
as three different levels; material, personal and territorial, simultaneously. For a deeper 
understanding the three directives, Services Directive and PRD need to be read together with 
the definitions in PRD, as was suggested by the AG and done by the Court in Fermabel and 
Ottica.  
6.2.2 Healthcare services in EU law and the nature of healthcare 
Art168 TFEU mentions mental and physical health as part of public health. Also prevention 
of diseases is mentioned. Nevertheless, it is not nearly as wide as either the WHO concept of 
health or what many people would consider as health. Genuine healthcare in EU Law is ‘to 
assess, maintain or restore their state of health’272  taking place at a specific stage. Even some 
sort of activity level from the healthcare professional providing the healthcare must exist or 
the service is not ‘genuine healthcare’. (Chapter 4.4) Even prescription, dispensation and 
provision of medical products are included. (Chapter 4.5)What exactly is covered by 
healthcare is set by the national law of each individual MS.  
Instead of concentrating on health, the traditional healthcare has taken a contrary approach by 
focusing on dealing with illness and disease. (Chapters 4.3- 4.4) A more positive medical 
view, the prevention of disease, has been gaining an increased foothold in healthcare 
systems.
273
 Thereby adding an aspect of positive focus to the assessment of as well as 
widening the concept of healthcare.  
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The Commission handbook
274
 partially reflects the traditional narrow concept of healthcare as 
it closes out wellbeing in the form of fitness clubs even though it is well documented that 
good physical condition helps prevent diseases of affluence such as cardiovascular 
diseases,
275
 diabetes and obesity.
 276
 Most likely this is to stay politically on the safe side. This 
narrow view is commonly shared among the MS’s, while the biggest variation of healthcare 
will be found on the positive approach.  
To what extent the MS’s apply positive aspects of healthcare policy is the outcome of the 
interaction of values and drivers, varying largely from MS to MS and culture to culture. It is 
crucial to be aware of the fact that assessment of the scope of healthcare must be done 
individually by each MS as the Commission’s handbook is not normative.  
Nonetheless, “genuine healthcare” is a part of the healthcare exemption formula. Its explicit 
key is the nature of the service and activity level at a given point in time based on an explicit 
need. 
6.2.3 The link between healthcare professional and patient  
Since the state of human health does not remain constantly unchanging, but is subject to at 
times even rapid changes, the timing is a fundamental component of healthcare. The missing 
ingredient of the healthcare exemption is the aspect of time. 
So to say, it is not possible to cure a patient who is already dead. Connected to the timing is 
the action, which classifies as healthcare. For that action to transpire at the correct time there 
must be some sort of direct link with the provider of the healthcare and the health status of the 
receiver of the healthcare. It is not possible to take into account….’each individual case of the 
medical circumstances and the clinical needs of the person concerned’ 277 unless the 
healthcare professional assessing, maintaining or restoring the patients state of health has 
access to specific data relating to the specific patient at a specific point of time. This data can 
of course be accessed by different methods, individual medical reports or personal contact of 
some kind with the patient. This removes the middlemen of healthcare sector from being part 
of the exemption 2.2(f). This line of thought gains support from ECJ case law.
278
  
A common factor in all cases studied in (Chapter s.4.3, 4.4 and 4.6) is that the exercise of a 
healthcare activity always occurs at the ‘end of the distribution’ chain as presented by pictures 
1 and 2 since it is directly linked to the patients state of health at a specific point in time.  
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Where that link to the patient is established is crucial for a correct evaluation of genuine 
healthcare. Is it for instance enough to provide healthcare within the meaning of the Services 
Directive in a situation where the healthcare professional only has access to an individual’s 
medical data, without any physical contact with the patient. 
In this evaluation, keen attention should be paid to numerous healthcare cases that lay it down 
clearly, that in order to determine an effective treatment for the patient, all the circumstances 
of each specific case must be taken into account. This includes the degree of pain the patient 
is in or the nature of the patient's disability as well as the patients’ medical history.279 This 
indicates that processing or analyzing a totally isolated part, not linked to the state of the 
health of the patient, and with no contextual regard to the individual patient’s actual state of 
health as a whole, would not be healthcare within the meaning of the healthcare exemption. 
Thus, a pure processing of data, e.g. a lab analyzing a batch of blood samples without 
connecting it any further to a specific patient, should not be deemed as healthcare.  The 
situation is different if the lab’s analysis is done to determine a person’s medical condition, 
i.e. genuine healthcare occurs.  
An entirely different question is if there should be differential dealing by EU law, vis-à-vis on 
how that overall assessment of the medical condition of the patient is done, i.e. must there be 
a physical contact with the patient; is information submitted by phone or e-mail enough or 
even an analysis of a medical record of the actual patient. It should be adequate enough that 
there is a personal contact by phone, as e.g. information and assessment provided by the 
medical personnel at poison information centers, emergency centers and medical on-call 
services as healthcare. However, in lack of special know-how in the medical area, to ensure a 
proper call, this criterion should be refined by the specialist in the area.  
The main finding relevant for the NA is that they do not however need to assess what the 
specific link is; it should be enough to establish that such a link exists provided the link is 
related to the establishing of health status. Basically, even though natural or legal persons of 
the MS’s are considered as service providers or receivers, the ones who actually perform and 
receive the healthcare service are always physical persons.  
6.2.4 The personal link (end of distribution chain) PRD+SD 
ECJ left unmentioned a very important factor, the personal link in Fermabel but touched upon 
it in Ottica. The AG’s opinions had an elaborated discussion around this link even though 
they did not use the exact wording. Since healthcare occurs as a transaction involving the 
patient and healthcare professionals in a manner that the professional must always be aware of 
the patients individual medical condition, healthcare service will always occur at the end of 
distribution chain. (Chapter 4.6) This is an important part of the formula for the healthcare 
exemption and should actually be the starting point of the whole - healthcare or not healthcare 
assessment. 
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6.2.5 The principal part (Ottica and Fermabel) 
It is true that the ruling in Fermabel clarified several issues regarding the scope of 2.2(f). But 
by doing so, several new questions arose.  
One relevant question is: what legislative tool should be applied to the personnel working at 
Healthcare providers that are not providing any healthcare at all (e.g. cleaners, auditors)? If 
the SD is not the correct one do they fall under the Treaties even though the area and the 
services are particularly mentioned as commercial activities being within the scope of SD by 
the Commissions handbook? Does this mean that the people working within those settings are 
not covered by the notification obligation? After Fermabel and Ottica the classification of in-
house non-healthcare personnel is effected by the spillover effect. If they are outsourced 
personnel, they should fall within the scope of the Services Directive. (Chapter 4.9)  
However the extension of the spillover effect is ambiguous. The situation for the in-house, 
non-healthcare personnel, remains uncertain since the subject matter for the question placed 
with the Court in Fermabel was if the entire operation of the service provider (day and night 
care centers) was considered to be healthcare or not.  
The Court’s preliminary ruling provides a criterion for interpreting and assessing healthcare 
activities; if the predominant part of the services offered can be identified as health care 
services, it establishes the service provider as a health care service provider. 
The Court only mentions “care staff” and paramedical staff.280 What is left unmentioned is the 
legal situation of the individual’s not providing healthcare. AG Villalon discusses personnel 
other than healthcare professionals only in conjunction with care personnel working under the 
supervision of healthcare professionals. Thus the role of specific individuals that work for the 
healthcare service providers in a role other than healthcare and not under the supervision of 
the healthcare professionals (i.e. auditors etc.) are not covered directly by the relevant case 
law. Consequently, as the Commissions handbook still stands as the only guide for these types 
of activities, these individual’s activities should fall under the scope of the Services Directive. 
Another relevant question in this area is; If the classification of ‘genuine healthcare’ activities 
is defined by what constitutes the main part of the service providers operation and thus 
outside the scope of SD, as the Court judged; what does that mean when the predominant part 
of those services are commercial? 
By the same logic, e contrario, the whole operation is considered as commercial and hence 
falls under the SD. Controversially this would even cover the part of operation that is genuine 
healthcare provided by a health professional of a regulated profession by the MS where the 
service is being delivered. One might draw the conclusion that the ‘spillover effect’ of 
Fermabel is a one way street, i.e. only predominance in healthcare does spillover not vice 
versa. To play devil’s advocate; one of the purposes of the healthcare exemption is to ensure a 
high level of public health. A vice versa situation could be seen as rendering this purpose of 
the exemption hollow. I.e. what happens to the public health concern where the healthcare 
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service is not predominant part of the operations of the company, but healthcare services are 
still part of the services offered?  Public health considerations should protect healthcare 
service receivers. However, the AG in Fermabel discussed and affirmed that also an e 
contrario interpretation is the correct way of applying the spillover effect in accordance to the 
‘spillover effect’ of Fermabel in points 29-36 of his opinion. Venturini provides a solution. 
6.2.6 Public health concerns 
What if a commercial service is not separable from public health concerns? Then the service 
will likely be outside of the Services Directive in line with Venturini and Ottica. Venturini 
does not even mention the Services Directive. Both Ottica and Fermabel talk about public 
general interest objectives, naming especially public health concerns and link this to the 
healthcare exemption of SD. Thus activities that may raise issues of public health, being 
connected to a provision of services or the performance of the service itself, should be 
assessed as healthcare. Combined with the fact that one of the reasons healthcare was 
exempted from the SD on basis of inter alia the same concerns this makes sense.
281
 Here 
however the line between services and goods become a little fuzzy. It seems that the 
classification of the goods, in casu a medical device or medical product, reflected in the 
classification of the service. This does not however lead to the service necessary being 
healthcare. For that to be the outcome the person engaged in the activity must be a healthcare 
professional.  
The question is if this can be guaranteed by a directive with the commercial character of the 
Services Directive, which also covers the receivers and providers of a variable and wide range 
of services and concentrates of requirements as a whole instead of the relevant concerns of a 
patient.  
The answer must be that activities, even closely related to healthcare services or public health 
concerns, will be assessed by the relevant Treaty articles like Venturini. Here a paramedical 
operation bore sufficient resemblance to pharmacies, being genuine healthcare, even though 
they were of a commercial nature. This allowed Italy to restrict the establishment of these 
para-pharmacies.  
When the Courts reasoning in Venturini is compared with sales of some non-description 
medicine in food stores and supermarkets is acceptable by some MS’s, 282 an example of the 
level of independence the NA’s have of deciding where the line of public health concern is 
drawn at national level.
283
  
Therefore, by logic of Venturini, the Fermabel spillover doctrine cannot be interpreted too 
widely, as the public health considerations become relevant. The two-way spillover effect 
must have been put in place by the Court purely for the sake of coherence, to enable an easier 
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and more unified assessment and application of the healthcare exemption in the different 
MS’s.  
6.2.7 Qualifications required of the people providing the service (PQD) 
As it is clear that even though the service itself does not change, the classification of it seems 
to do so based on the predominant part of the nature of the service (of services provided), the 
next question to answer is the qualifications required of the people providing the service 
leading to one more element of the formula of healthcare exemption.   
As has been established so far by this thesis, for healthcare services to be excluded from the 
Services Directive they must be provided by members of a health profession regulated 
nationally by the relevant MS. Reference to what a regulated profession means is given in art 
4 (11) SD, which defines ‘regulated profession’ as ‘professional activity or a group of 
professional activities as referred to in Article 3(1) (a) of PQD. There is not a clear criterion 
of what really is a regulated profession, but from EU jurisprudence the requirement of 
specificity of the acquired skills is the key feature. Further, due to the restrictive definition of 
‘regulated education’ in the PQD284, covering only educations aimed specifically at pursuing 
that profession, healthcare professionals passing through the general assessment may be not 
categorised as such.  
Remarkably the Court in Fermabel did not refer to the PQD regarding the matter of healthcare 
professionals. Instead they added a new dimension for the healthcare professionals by viewing 
only the PRD. This interpretation does patch the issue created by ‘regulated education’ 
mentioned above. 
Thus the SD, PRD and PQD may be melded to ‘healthcare professionals recognized as such 
by the Member State concerned’.285 A direct consequence of this decision was that the 
designated NA’s were given the additional burden of establishing a method for identification 
of the people who belong to the group of healthcare professionals. 
6.2.8 Healthcare performed by regulated professions  
This can be provided in three different ways, by:  
 Automatic recognition when a doctor of medicine, a nurse when responsible of general 
care, a dental practitioner, a midwife or a pharmacist in accordance to PQD(sectorial 
professions) 
 a practitioner of healthcare activities which are reserved to regulated profession in 
accordance to the definition in PQD art 3.1(a)( EU) 
 or a person considered to be a health professional according to the legislation of the 
Member State of treatment (if not covered by the definition of PQD art 3.1(a)( EU)) 
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The definitions are a matter of Union law
286
 but the actual application, i.e. what to regulate 
and the choice of which professions to regulate is the choice of the MS as long as they stay 
within the framework of the PQD.  
One of the functions of the exemption of healthcare from the SD is to ensure a high quality of 
healthcare services. As a result, MS’s have relatively wide leeway in asserting restrictions 
based on public health concerns. Thus paramedical activities are more likely than not to be 
assessed under the Treaty regulations, not the Services Directive. 
6.3 Conclusion 
The subject matter of the SD differs from the system by which ECJ operates. The Courts 
decisions regarding operations of undertakings are made on a case-by case basis, whereas the 
SD is aimed at requirements as a whole. Thus, the purpose of this thesis was to find a solution 
for the existing legal uncertainty concerning the healthcare exemption in art 2(2) (f). By 
defining the scope of the health exemption as precisely as possible, suspect measures can be 
properly assessed for the purpose of the notification requirement. Further, the intention was to 
develop easily applicable model for the analysis process to enable a smooth unified 
implementation in practice by the NBT on the subject. 
My starting point was to argue that a strict reading of art 2.2(f) SD read together with recital 
22SD, the only tool available for the NA’s until the recent rulings, does not necessary lead to 
a correct interpretation of the exemption. As a consequence unnecessary legal uncertainty 
remains, possibly resulting in misinterpretation of the rule. This needs to be dealt with in more 
detail on an EU level for a correct and harmonized interpretation in the MS’s. My key 
research question was ‘What is the precise scope of Article 2.2(f) as can be defined within the 
current status of Union law?’ My starting point was correct. But the study took me on a legal 
path more profound than I had anticipated. 
Due to the uninformative nature of art 2(2) (f) SD, it must be read in light of recital 22 SD. 
These together establish two cumulative criteria of the healthcare exemption that needed to be 
defined as clearly as possible. Another aspect is brought in by the necessary criteria of 
regulated healthcare professionals by art 4.11 SD, targeting the person preforming the service 
and the know-how, i.e. the professional requirement, that specific person has as well what 
activity that person preforms at a specific point of time linked directly to the patients (service 
receivers) state of health. Fermabel introduced the PRD as one more legal instrument that 
affects the scope of the healthcare exemption. Ottica confirms the link between the SD and 
the PQD. 
Healthcare seems to be divided in medical proper and paramedical. The paramedical are 
considered as healthcare, not wellbeing, if they are either linked to the medical proper as a 
part of the treatment of in some cases as standalone paramedical as was demonstrated by 
Eleftherios. (Chapter 5.4) In regards to standalone paramedical, either their medical nature 
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must be impeccably clear-cut, like the opticians measuring sight etc. like in Ottica, or they 
should be sufficiently similar to medical proper to be considered at least as partially 
‘substitutable’ to the medical sectorial professions like in Venturini. Sectorial professions, e.g. 
pharmacist are always a regulated healthcare professional in the MS, as it is one of the 
harmonized professions by EU rules.   
Thus the requirements for the service itself, the person preforming the service and the direct 
personal link connected to a specific point of time of the patient’s (service receivers) state of 
health are just different layers of the same thing, healthcare. Variable factors due to 
differences between MS’s are territorial; 
 Legislation 
 Healthcare services provided 
 Requirements for the service provider 
 Requirements for the person preforming the service 
Territorial – i.e. the territory (MS) decide what healthcare is appropriate and under what 
circumstances they are provided as well as what formal qualifications are required of the 
persons to allow them to perform the service. Paramedical are covered to the extent of 
national treatment. A regulatory provision on goods, requiring a mandatory authorization of 
the person preforming a service linked with a requirement of certain know how the person 
must possess the good, outcome is that that person is of a regulated profession.   
Where public health concerns arise in line with Venturini, even activities of a commercial 
nature that are not healthcare, will most likely fall outside of the Services Directive. Venturini 
also supports that the key for public healthcare is the nature of the service, the professional 
status of the provider of that service and how strongly it affects to the rest of the service 
activities offered by the same provider.  
Here is where the subject matter of the SD, PRD and PQD meet and meld to encompass the 
different aspects of different requirements in a three 
dimensional model.  
The formula must be of four parts 
 the nature of the service provided,  
o healthcare 
 the predominant part of the service 
 the persons providing the service 
o healthcare professionals 
 the direct link 
For a whole picture of the exemption of healthcare in SD the three Directives must be read 
together, as demonstrated by picture 7 and in light of each other. Only this way is the true 
nature and the scope of the exemption of healthcare within the meaning of the Services 
Figure 7 Directive overlap 
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Directive revealed. The area where all those three meet is the healthcare exemption in 2.2(f) 
SD. 
The NA deal with requirements aimed at provision of services in some form. To identify and 
asses the presence of a 2.2(f) SD healthcare exemption in a service/services, the author of this 
thesis recommends taking the following steps. 
The steps are cumulative; all must be in place for the exemption of healthcare to be in place. 
Otherwise, the Services Directive will be fully applicable for the service provided, unless a 
Venturini situation amounting to a public health concern is present.  Further guidance in form 
of case law from the ECJ or at least as guidelines from the Commission on the subject would 
however be extremely useful to confirm or to point out errors in this reasoning.  
Even though the different MS’s are bound to have a large variation in implementation of the 
healthcare exemption based on the level they regulate professions, the matter seems to be 
dealt with to some extent on an EU level by the implementation of the new PQD. With an 
automatic exclusion of healthcare professionals from the Services Directive a correct and 
harmonized interpretation in the MS’s of the exemption will be more realistic. This is likely to 
cause a domino effect; if healthcare professionals will automatically be outside the scope of 
the Services Directive it will be enough to establish that a service is being performed by a 
healthcare professional. This would reduce the need for complicated analysis. However, until 
the draft of the new PQD is fully implemented and we have more cases from the ECJ as 
regards this matter, it is difficult to predict the exact path the future rulings will take.  
What is unlikely to change are the issues of classification of paramedical due to the different 
views the MS’s have regarding them, as either healthcare professionals or purely pursuers of 
commercial activities. This is unfortunate; an EU level recognition of paramedical as 
healthcare professionals would simplify the whole assessment process as well as fix the 
mutual recognition issues. There might be no remedy for this situation, as it is based on the 
Figure 8 A step-by-step guide for the healthcare exemption 
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cultural values varying from state to state within EU. This is a complicated matter constituting 
a dilemma for the legislators, but it is also the nature and richness of EU.  
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Annex 1 
Contact details of bodies designated to assist service recipients 
(Article 21 Bodies) 
15/07/2013 
Member 
State 
Body designated (for providing 
information to 
consumers) 
Body designated (for providing 
information to businesses) 
Austria Europäisches Verbraucherzentrum 
Österreich(European Consumer Centre 
Austria) 
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich 
(Austrian Federal Economic 
Chamber) 
Belgium SPF Economie, PME, Classes 
moyennes et Energie 
(DG Contrôle et Médiation - 
Coopération internationale) 
SPF Economie, PME, Classes 
moyennes et Energie 
(DG Contrôle et Médiation - 
Coopération internationale) 
Bulgaria Point of Single Contact in cooperation 
with the European 
Consumer Centre 
Contact details of bodies designated 
to assist service recipients 
(Article 21 Bodies) 
Croatia  Croatia European Consumer Center 
Croatia (ECC-Net) 
Point of Single Contact Croatia 
Cyprus Cyprus European Consumer Centre 
(Cyprus) (ECC-Net) 
Point of Single Contact Cyprus 
Czech 
Republic 
Czech Republic Points of Single 
Contact(Ministry of Industry and 
Trade) 
Czech Republic Points of Single 
Contact(Ministry of Industry and 
Trade) 
Denmark Denmark Forbruger Europa (ECC-
Net) 
 
Estonia Estonia EUROPEAN CONSUMER 
CENTRE ESTONIA (ECC-Net) 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications 
Finland The Finnish Competition and 
Consumer Authority (FCCA) 
Point of Single Contact (The Finnish 
Competition and Consumer 
Authority) 
France Centre Européen des Consommateurs 
France(European Consumer Centre 
France (ECC-Net) 
Enterprise Europe Network Paris 
Ile-de-France Centre (PIC²) Paris 
Chamber of commerce and industry 
(CCIP) 
Germany Bundesamt für Verbraucherschutz und 
Lebensmittelsicherheit (Federal Office 
of Consumer 
Protection and Food Safety) 
Germany Trade & Invest - 
Gesellschaft für Außenwirtschaft 
und 
Standortmarketing mbH (Bonn 
Office (Trade)) 
Greece Ombudsman for Consumers Enterprise Europe Network – Hellas 
Help – Forward Network 
Hungary European Consumer Centre Hungary 
(ECC-Net) 
Enterprise Europe Network 
ITD Hungary Zrt. 
Iceland Neytendastofa (Consumer Agency) Efnahags- og viðskiptaráðuneytið 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs) 
Ireland European Consumer Centre Ireland Galway Chamber of Commerce 
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(ECC-Net) 
Italy ECC-Net Italy Unioncamere (Chambers of 
Commerce) through points of single 
contacts: 
Latvia European Consumer Centre Latvia 
ECC-Net (ECC Latvia) 
Investment and Development 
Agency of Latvia 
Liechtenstein Amt für Handel und Transport 
(Fachbereich Konsumentenschutz, 
Urheberrecht und unlauterer 
Wettbewerb) 
Einheitlicher Ansprechpartner/ Point 
of Single Contact 
(Amt für Volkswirtschaft / Office 
for Economic Affairs) 
Lithuania Europos vartotojų centras (ECC-Net) 
European Consumer Centre in 
Lithuania 
Public Institution Enterprise 
Lithuania 
Point of Single Contact for Services 
and Products 
Luxembourg European Consumer Centre 
Luxembourg (ECC-Net) 
Espace Entreprises de la Chambre 
de Commerce de Luxembourg 
Malta European Consumer Centre (MALTA) 
(ECC-Net) 
Malta Enterprise, Enterprise Centre, 
Industrial Estate 
Norway The European Consumer Centre 
(ECC-Net) 
Enterprise Europe Network 
Innovation Norway 
Poland Point of Single Contact 
Ministry of Economy 
Point of Single Contact 
Ministry of Economy 
Portugal Centro Europeu do Consumidor 
(European Consumer Centre 
ECC-Net) 
Instituto de Apoio às PequeNA’s e 
Médias Empresas e à Inovação 
– IAPMEI (Institute of Support to 
Small and Medium Enterprises and 
Innovation) 
Romania European Consumer Centre Romania 
(ECC-Net) 
 
Slovakia European Consumer Centre Slovakia 
(ECC-Net) 
Ministry of Economy of the Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia Evropski potrošniški center (European 
Consumer Centre 
Slovenia (ECC-Net)) 
Obrtno-podjetniška zbornica 
Slovenije (Chamber of craft and 
small business) 
Gospodarska zbornica Slovenije 
(Chamber of commerce and 
industry) 
Spain European Consumer Centre (Spain) 
(ECC-Net) 
Instituto Nacional de Consumo 
Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y 
Comercio Dirección General de 
Política de la PYME 
Sweden The Swedish Consumer Agency 
(ECC-Net) 
The National Board of Trade 
The 
Netherlands 
The Consumer Authority 
Consumentenautoriteit (BackOffice 
Consumentenautoriteit) 
Antwoord voor bedrijven ("Dutch 
Point of Single Contact") Ministerie 
van Economische Zaken 
United 
Kingdom 
The European Consumer Centre for 
Services 
Trading Standards Institute (TSI) 
Point of Single Contact: Business 
Link 
Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills 
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Annex 2 Regulated professions in Sweden287 
 
 Advokat, kontakta Sveriges advokatsamfund 
 Apotekare, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Arbetsterapeut, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Audionom, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Auktoriserad tolk, kontakta Kammarkollegiet  
 Auktoriserad translator, kontakta Kammarkollegiet  
 Barnmorska, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Biomedicinsk analytiker, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Brandskyddskontroll, kontakta Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB) 
 Dietist, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Djursjukskötare, kontakta Jordbruksverket 
 Elinstallatör, kontakta Elsäkerhetsverket 
 Fastighetsmäklare, kontakta Fastighetsmäklarnämnden 
 Hovslagare, kontakta Jordbruksverket 
 Kiropraktor, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Logoped, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Läkare, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Lärare och förskollärare i det offentliga skolväsendet, kontakta Skolverket 
 Naprapat, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Optiker, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Ortopedingenjör, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Patentombud, kontakta Patentombudsnämnden 
 Psykolog, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Psykoterapeut, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Receptarie, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Röntgensjuksköterska, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Sjukgymnast, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Sjukgymnast inom djurens hälso- och sjukvård, kontakta Jordbruksverket 
 Sjukhusfysiker, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Sjuksköterska, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Sjuksköterska inom djurens hälso- och sjukvård, kontakta Jordbruksverket 
 Tandhygienist, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Tandläkare, kontakta Socialstyrelsen 
 Tandläkare inom djurens hälso- och sjukvård, kontakta Jordbruksverket 
 Trafiklärare, kontakta Transportstyrelsen 
 Veterinär, kontakta Jordbruksverket 
 Väktare, kontakta Länsstyrelsen i Stockholms län (avdelningen för rättsliga frågor) 
 
 
 
                                                 
287
 Education, 2012http://www.uhr.se/sv/Bedomning-av-utlandsk-utbildning/Utlandsk-utbildning/Arbeta-i-
Sverige/Reglerade-yrken-i-Sverige/ 
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Annex 3 Notifications & decisions made in Sweden concerning 
2.2(f) SD 
2011 
Notifications 
Amendment of existing 
rules 
 New rules 
Subject-matter 2011/01478       Appointment and provision of 
pharmaceuticals and other 
products. 
Supply of hospital drugs  
Case no MPA 2011/00381-3   2011/01514       
NA behind the 
measure 
Change of MPA rules 
(LVFS 1997:13) regarding 
prescribing certain 
products.  
MPA MPA 
Restriction Change of MPA rules 
(LVFS 1997:13) regarding 
prescribing certain 
products. 
Proposed amendment to the 
MPA rules (LVFS 2009:13) 
for the appointment and 
provision of medical products 
and industrial alcohol. 
Draft on  hospital drug 
supply regulations  
Decision by NA No notification obligation. No notification obligation. Partial notification 
obligation 
Grounds of 
exemption of 
notification 
Art 2(2)(f)SD  Art 2(2)(f)SD   
Grounds of 
notification 
requirement 
     
 
2012 
Notificat
ions 
  New rules    
Subject-
matter 
Supply and 
delivery of 
pharmaceuticals 
and other 
products 
Amendment of  
MPA rules 
Supply and 
delivery of 
pharmaceuticals 
and other products 
Pharmacovi
gilance 
Provision of 
medicinal 
products for 
human use 
Esthetical 
surgery 
Case no 2012/01832       2012/01560       2012/01819       2012/00550       2012/01534       2012/01250-2 
NA 
behind 
the 
measure 
MPA MPA MPA MPA MPA  National 
Board of 
Health and 
Welfare 
Restricti
on 
Proposal of 
amendment in 
the MPA rules 
over supply and 
delivery of some 
medical products  
Draft rules (2013: 
xx) on the 
operation of 
active substances 
intended for 
human use and 
modification of 
LVFS(2004:6) 
and 
LVFS(2006:11)                                                   
MPA rules over 
supply and 
delivery of 
medical products 
containing 
isotretinoin. 
The 
Swedish 
MPA's rules 
on the 
pharmacovi
gilance of 
medicinal 
products for 
human use. 
The Swedish 
MPA's 
proposal for 
new 
regulations on 
provision of 
medicinal 
products for 
human use 
The National 
Board of 
Health and 
Welfare rules 
on esthetic 
surgery. 
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Decision 
by NBT 
No notification 
obligation 
Notification 
obligation 
No notification 
obligation 
Notifiable to 
the part 
which does 
not relate to 
pharmacy. 
Several 
requirements 
are notifiable 
in accordance 
with art 39.5. 
Health 
exception does 
not appear to 
be applicable. 
At least 
partially 
notifiable. 
Needs further 
assessment 
when the bill 
and the 
appurtenant 
rules have 
been remitted. 
Grounds 
of 
exemptio
n of 
notificati
on 
Art 2(2)(f)SD   Art 2(2)(f) SD 
due to covering 
doctors and 
pharmacies 
      
Grounds 
of 
notificati
on 
requirem
ent. 
  2013: xx:is 
about inter alia 
distributors, not 
exempted by art 
2(2)(f) 
medical 
exception 
because not a 
regulated 
profession. A 
new notification 
is a requirement 
that is 
notifiable. 
  (24.5) the 
implementat
ion of the 
amending 
Directive 
(and old 
directive). 
  Esthetical 
surgery is 
most likely not 
healthcare.  
 
 
2013 
Notification
s  
Amendment of 
existing rules 
Kolumn1 New rules Kolumn2 Kolumn3 
Subject-
matter 
Change of fees  Appointment and 
provision of 
pharmaceutical and 
other products. 
Retail sales  Compensation 
and 
environmental 
concerns. 
Distance trade 
by pharmacies. 
Case no 2013/00459         2013/00715       2013/00357       2013/00894  2013/00910       
PA behind 
the measure 
MPA  MPA MPA Ministry of 
Health and 
Social Affairs 
MPA 
Restriction Proposal of 
amendment of fees 
to Apotekens 
Service AB.     
Proposed amendment 
to the MPA rules 
(LVFS 2009:13) for the 
appointment and 
provision of medicinal 
and industrial alcohol. 
MPA rules over 
pharmacies retail. 
Compensation 
for drug injury 
and 
environmental 
concerns 
regarding 
pharmaceutica
l benefits. 
SOU 2013:23  
The MPA's 
rules regarding 
distance trade 
by pharmacies. 
Decision by 
NA 
Recommendation of 
notification.  
Notification obligation 
if the MPA estimates 
that pharmacy 
operations are not 
restricted to regulated 
healthcare professions. 
Otherwise exempted on 
grounds of art 
2(2)(f)SD. 
The legal situation is 
unclear. The MPA 
determines to notify 
or not according to 
art 39(5) on grounds 
whether a pharmacy 
can be operated on 
temporary basis. 
No notification 
obligation. 
No notification 
obligation. 
Grounds of 
exemption 
of 
      Art 2(2)(f)SD Art 2(2)(f)SD 
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notification 
Grounds of 
notification 
requirement 
Recommendation to 
notify since the fees 
can be claimed to 
affect the pharmacy 
service providers. 
See above. Unclear whether the 
operation of 
pharmacies is 
covered by At 2(2) 
(F) SD exemption 
due to "restricted 
regulated healthcare 
profession." The 
lack of clarity has 
been reported. 
   
 
 
